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“Kung fu. It means, ‘supreme skill from hard work.’ A great poet has reached kung fu.
The painter, the calligrapher, they can be said to have kung fu. Even the cook, the one
who sweeps steps or a masterful servant can have kung fu. Practice. Preparation. Endless
repetition. Until your mind is weary, and your bones ache. Until you're too tired to sweat,
too wasted to breathe. That is the way, the only way one acquires kung fu.”
Marco Polo, Season 1, Episode 3: Feast
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Conventional authentication methods used in computer systems such as Personal Identi-
fication Number (PIN), password and token present security flaws (or vulnerabilities) as
they can be guessed, cracked, stolen or shared. Biometric authentication schemes have
presented themselves as better options as compared to traditional authentication meth-
ods as they exploit the uniqueness of a subject with regards to what they are or how they
behave.
This dissertation deals with the use of a behavioural biometric, Keystroke Dynamics
as a means of authentication for verifying online users. Firstly, we present a method
that reduces the amount of data by removing common typing patterns. We then show
that eliminating common patterns improves the discriminating ability of a classifier while
reducing the amount of data and therefore the time required to train a classifier.
We also present a novel keystroke dynamics authentication method that is based on
text retrieval concepts and methods. For the evaluation of our algorithm, we collect two
datasets in real-life environments. We then use our datasets together with other datasets
found in literature to test our algorithm on both classification and authentication-based
tasks. Furthermore, we show experimentally that a person’s typing behaviour is suscep-
tible to the environment in which they are typing.
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Glossary of Important Terms
Biometrics The science of using human physical, chemical and behavioural attributes
to uniquely identify a person.
Biometric System A pattern recognition system which makes a personal identifica-
tion or verification by determining the authenticity of a specific physiological or
behavioural characteristic possessed by the subject.
Behavioural Biometrics A branch of biometrics focused on measuring patterns in how
humans perform activities.
Keystroke Dynamics A type of a behavioural biometric based on the assumption that
individuals have unique typing rhythms.
Key Event A single action with a keyboard key. It is a key press if the key is pressed,
or a key release if the key is let go.
Key Logging The act of recording key events.
Keystroke The press and release of a single key.
Continuous Authentication A continuous authentication approach that verifies the




Over the years, a lot of time and effort have been invested in improving and enhancing
security and privacy of user accounts on various online platforms. However, throughout
history, we have learnt that there is no such thing as a perfect security system because
hackers find a loophole in a system. A lot of research and implementation of various static
and dynamic authentication methods has been done where a number of authentication
techniques such as the traditional PIN and password, biometrics and modern approaches
such as two factor authentication are combined to produce robust security systems [1].
Biometric verification refers to the process of validating a subject’s identity by means
of traits and characteristics that are unique to an individual such as fingerprint, face,
signature and voice, to mention but a few [1].
Educational institutions (mostly institutions of higher education) have adopted and im-
plemented the concept of e-learning and drifted away from doing every teaching and
learning activity through the conventional classroom approach [2]. This brought a large
increase in online learning courses offered by universities and other institutions via plat-
forms like edX, Udacity, Coursera and Udemy. Platforms such as Moodle have been
built to make publishing online courses much easier. Moodle reports just above 90,000
registered sites in over 200 countries around the world offering more than fourteen mil-
lion courses [3]. With this development came great benefits such as improved access to
education, affordable quality education, distance learning and flexibility when consider-
ing issues of place and time [4, 2]. The biggest challenge however with e-learning and
other online platforms is the issue of confirming the identity of the individual engaging
in the assessments. This challenge poses a threat to the credibility of online assessments
and courses. The posed question is: Whether the person performing online educational
activities is the registered student?
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Conventional authentication methods such as PIN, password and token have become
less robust over the years as they can be guessed, cracked, stolen or shared [1]. This has
created the need for more robust methods that can exploit the uniqueness of every user
to enhance security and address the online identity crisis. Apart from the application of
biometrics in this study, biometrics have positioned themselves as the more effective solu-
tion for human recognition in applications such as secure access control, law enforcement
and international border crossing. Biometrics, such as facial recognition and fingerprints
can be employed in the attempt of solving this problem since they provide a more per-
sonalized security since the way each individual types is unique. Biometrics have proved
to be more effective as they are more difficult to spoof due to their uniqueness property
and they cannot be shared.
This dissertation investigates the use of Keystroke Dynamics (KSD) as a means of veri-
fying a user’s identity online. KSD is a type of behavioural biometric used to monitor a
user’s typing signature by extracting and analysing timing information while they interact
with a keyboard in an attempt to identify them based on the rhythmic patterns in how
they type [5]. This biometric technology is employed in computer security, especially on
online platforms, due to the inherent anonymity of being on the Internet. The use cases
include, verification of online test takers [6, 7], password strengthening [5] and in online
banking. Some of the factors that make KSD attractive as a means of authentication are
[8, 9]:
 No additional sensor is required as an existing keyboard is used to acquire keystroke
data.
 Less obtrusive, since the user activities are not affected as data is acquired while
the user is busy with their online activities.
 Keystroke dynamics are available after the initial authentication step at the start
of an online session so they can be used to continuously verify the user.
KSD can be used together with traditional methods like PIN-Password as a supplement
in order to enhance the robustness of these conventional security. The benefit with
biometrics is that it provides personalized security which is not easy to crack.
1.1 Problem Statement
E-learning is becoming more and more popular as a way to increase the availability of
education to a larger audience. The use of e-learning has simplified and improved the
2
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process of teaching and learning. However, a big problem in e-learning is the question of
verifying the identity of the person who is taking an online assessment to confirm that the
user is the registered student and not someone else. This identity verification question
needs to be addressed to ensure the credibility of electronic assessments and qualifications
obtained via online courses. At present, conventional authentication methods such as
PIN, passwords, tokens and Short Message Service (SMS) based authentication are being
used. The challenge with the aforementioned methods is that they can be cracked, stolen
or the information can even be shared willingly by the rightful owner.
1.2 Research Question
To what degree of accuracy can the identity of a user be confirmed using a biometric
based on the user’s typing signature?
1.3 Research Objectives
The primary objective of this study shall be to design, implement and test a system for
verifying the identity of a website user based on the users typing signature. The system
shall enrol users and verify their identity at a later stage. Furthermore, the proposed
solution shall detect and report anomalies. The secondary objectives of this dissertation
are:
1. To identify optimum features and their possible combinations that uniquely repre-
sent the user’s typing behaviour in a way that ensures high accuracy of authenti-
cation.
2. To investigate whether a user’s typing behaviour is consistent regardless of the
change in environments.
3. To implement a classification technique that will ensure a high degree of accuracy.
1.4 Research Scope
This project will focus on the design and implementation of algorithms that attempt to
accurately confirm the identity of a website user based on the user’s typing biometric.
This study will be subject to the following constraints:
 The study will be limited to the application of keystroke dynamics as a method of
verification or confirmation and not identification.
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 The study will be limited to the e-learning domain.
 The free-text enrolment strategy will be used.
 The target device in this study will be a desktop Personal Computer (PC) or a
laptop. Therefore, mobile phones, tablet PCs or any devices with virtual keyboards
will be excluded.
 Only the QWERTY computer keyboard will be used as a sensor.
1.5 Contributions
This dissertation makes the following contributions:
1. Two datasets of anonymous users and their typing patterns collected in real-world
situations. The datasets are collected in two different environments, namely, a
closed and an open environment.
2. Two methods of detecting and removing common typing traits amongst users in a
typist dataset. The first method is based on a machine learning novelty detection
algorithm, the One-Class Support Vector Machines (OC-SVM). The second method
is based on text retrieval concepts and uses a stop list (list of all words/terms that
are used excessively in a language) to filter out typing traits exhibited by most users.
This removal of the common data is done with aim of improving the discrimination
ability of the classifier.
3. A novel keystroke analysis authentication algorithm for free-text input. This algo-
rithm uses text retrival methods and concepts to convert authentication by keystroke
dynamics into a text retirval problem.
1.6 Research Methodology
The methodology applied in this research is founded on the engineering research method
and will commence by exploring the existing literature in biometrics authentication par-
ticularly keystroke dynamics as an authentication technique. The literature review shall
help provide in-depth knowledge regarding the use of keystroke dynamics as a method
of authentication in web systems and the current state-of-the-art techniques which are
employed to accurately verify the identity of a website user. Furthermore, undertaking
the literature study will help investigate metrics that could be employed to evaluate the
performance of the implemented algorithms.
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The second phase will be focused on data collection and analysis. Here, a web-based
keystroke logger that records timing data as subjects interact with the keyboard will be
built. The data will then be collected by running the data collection system in a browser
on a PC with a QWERTY keyboard. The collected data will then be analysed by em-
ploying statistical measures and classifiers in order to select optimal features that could
be used for uniquely identifying subjects.
After the all the data has been proccessed to produce the final dataset, the dataset
will be split into three different smaller sets, namely, the training, validation and test
sets. The training set will be used to train the implemented classification algorithms.
To compare variations of the classification models against each other during the experi-
mentation phase, a validation dataset will be used. After the best performing model has
been determined, the test dataset will then be used to evaulate the performance of the
final model. All of this is done to ensure that the classifications models developed do not
overfit.
From performing a review of the achieved results, conclusions will be drawn and rec-
ommendations will be suggested for future research.
1.7 Publications
The publications produced during the course of this study include:
 Mokoena, Thato and Sabatta, Deon. Identifying and Removing Common Behaviour
in Keystroke Dynamics to Improve Classification. In: Southern Africa Telecommu-
nication Networks and Applications Conference (SATNAC) 2019– The Changing
Face of Telcos in a Digital World. 01-04 September 2019, Ballito, KwaZulu-Natal,
South Africa. Discussed in Chapter 5.
 Mokoena, Thato and Sabatta, Deon. User Classification by Keystroke Dynamics
using Text Retrieval Methods. In: 2020 Joint SAUPEC/RobMech/PRASA Sympo-
sium. 29-31 January 2020, Observatory, Cape Town, Western Cape, South Africa.
Discussed in Chapters 6 and 7.
1.8 Dissertation Outline
The remainder of this dissertation document is organised as follows:
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 Chapter 2 will give an overview of biometrics, and introduce core concepts that will
be used to describe keystroke authentication in subsequent chapters. Furthermore,
the existing literature in keystroke dynamics will be explored which includes the
state-of-the-art, as well as the similar works that have been done by various research
groups.
 Chapter 3 will provide a detailed description of the data collection process.
 Chapter 4 will describe how the collected data was analysed and processed in
order to extract features and eventually create the dataset used in this study. The
analysis will mainly focus on how the data was prepared for usage to be consumed
by the algorithms which will be used to learn the user’s typing pattern.
 Chapter 5 will present a method for improving the discrimination ability of a
classifier by removing common typing patterns.
 Chapter 6 will present a novel KSD authentication algorithm for free-text input.
 Chapter 7 will present the results obtained from evaluating the authentication
algorithm proposed in Chapter 6 together with the discussion and analysis of these
results.





The key events that formed the basis for keystroke dynamics as we know it today took
place in the mid and late 1800s through two inventions and the introduction of the
theory of ”anthropometrics” by Alphonse Bertillon [10]. The inventions are, the telegraph
which was developed in the 1830s by Samuel F.B. Morse and the modern typewriter by
Christopher L. Sholes in the 1870s [11, 12, 13]. Morse’s telegraph, which was a major
long distance communitaction device in the 19th century used the Morse Code, which
is a representation of alphabets and numbers as dots and dashes [12, 13]. Typewriters
had been around since the 1700s but their keyboards were a single line of keys arranged
alphabetically in a piano-like format as shown in Figure 2.1 [14].
Figure 2.1: Single line typewriter keyboard layout [14].
The QWERTY keyboard arrangement (shown in Figure 2.2) was created by Sholes with
the aim of preventing neighbouring typewriting bars from jamming by placing common
letter pairs onto separate hands [11]. The QWERTY keyboard arrangement is the most
used keyboard format today1. The most used style of typing during the days of the single
line keyboard was the ”hunt-and-peck”–first the typist hand to find the keys and then
strike them using the index fingers of either hand [11]. When the QWERTY keyboard
was introduced typists could not type as fast as they did due to the changes in the format.
To remedy this problem touch typing was employed, the typists had to memorize the keys
1There is also the Dvorak’s keyboard arrangement which is the second most used keyboard layout.
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and type using four fingers of each hand, with the thumb used for the space bar. Lessons
and training were then given to teach the skill of touch typing.
Figure 2.2: Sholes’ QWERTY keyboard layout [15].
Dvorak et al. [16] were the first to publish a book based on the study of typing behaviour
and in this book they made an observation that despite the typists receiving the same
lessons and training, each typist had their own style that uniquely discriminates them
from the others. It is in this book, were the first example of typing being used a biometric
was document. Furthermore, around the time [16] made the aforementioned observations
it is said that during telegraph era (early 1900s) telegraph operators could distinguish
each other by listening to the tapping rhythm of the dots and dashes [8].
The use of biometrics as a means of verification predates the invention of typing. In
ancient Babylon and China fingerprints were used to sign legal documents and in the
ancient Egypt the Nile Valley traders were formally identified using physical attributes
such as eye colour [17, 10]. Ironically, the field of biometrics was only formally described
after the creation of the modern typewriter. It was in 1882 when Bertillon introduced
”anthropometrics” (”human measurements”) where he took measurements of persons
and noting unique features such as scars or tattoos with the aim of using those recorded
features to later identify the persons [10]. The same idea introduced by Bertillon came to
be known as biometrics (”life measurements”) years later. In present time, biometrics are
employed in security systems to verify the persons based on the physical and behavioural
characteristics such as fingerprints and typing signature respectively.
In the past, the telegraph key and typewriter keyboard served as input devices and
today, the computer keyboard, mobile keypad and touchscreen panels serve as input de-
vices. Ever since [18] presented keystroke dynamics as a viable means of authentication
in computer security this study field has gained momentum.
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The benefits and shortcomings of KSD as a means of verification will be discussed. Fur-
thermore, the existing literature will be explored and presented. This chapter will end
with the review of the application of machine learning based classifiers in KSD.
2.1 User Authentication in Computer Security
Authentication is the process of verifying if someone is, in fact, who she/he claims to
be. Verification and identification are usually confused and thought to be the same but
they are different. Identification involves recognizing a subject by searching through all
the stored user templates in the database in order to find a match whereas verification
validates a subject’s identity by comparing the captured data with the template(s) stored
in the system’s database belonging to that particular subject [19]. Thus, identification is
a 1 : n (one-to-many) relationship and verification is a 1 : 1 (one-to-one) relationship.
In computer security authentication can be achieved by satisfying one or a combination
of the three criteria. The criteria are [19, 20]:
 Knowledge based: What you know
 Possession based: What you have
 Biometric based: What you are
An authentication system consists of the following core elements [9, 21]:
 Initiator: a user that needs to be authenticated in order to gain access.
 Distinctive traits: attributes that can uniquely discriminate between different users
or groups based on what the user knows, has or is.
 Administrator: responsible for usage of the authentication system and relies of on
automatic authentication discriminate authorized users from the unauthorized ones.
 Authentication mechanism: a way of verifying the user or group of users based on
the differentiating characteristics such as knowledge factors, possession factors and
biometric factors.
 Privilege: given when the user is successfully authenticated by the authentication




In the subsections to follow a brief description of each of the authentication criterion is
provided with an exception on the biometric based authentication scheme which will be
more lengthy as this study is focused on using a type of biometric as means of authenti-
cation.
2.1.1 Knowledge Based
For knowledge based authentication one has to remember a secret which is in the form
of a PIN, password or passphrase. The advantages of this method include easy imple-
mentation, low cost and fast authentication [20]. The challenge however is that a secret
may be forgotten when not written, stolen when written, shared when it is convenient
or guessed if it is too easy. All these shortcomings increase the limitations of using what
one knows as a principle authentication scheme.
2.1.2 Possession Based
In this scheme a physical token is used for means of authentication. The token can be
in the form of an electronic keycard, smart card or keys. Unlike the previous technique,
this technique does not require any memorizing. However, a token can suffer the same
fate as a secret as it can be stolen or shared. Furthermore, the cost of implementing
such a system is higher as it would require not only the physical token but the processing
equipment for purposes of verification [22].
2.1.3 Biometric Based
This authentication scheme is based on what the subject is. Here, biometrics are em-
ployed in order to uniquely identify subjects. The term biometrics is derived from two
Greek terms, bios which means life and metrons which means to measure [17]. Bio-
metrics is the science of using human physical, chemical and behavioural attributes to
uniquely identify a person [19]. These attributes include face, fingerprint, voice, keystroke
and many others to name but a few. There are two main classes of biometrics namely,
physiological/physical (static biometrics) and behavioural (dynamic biometrics) [17, 20].
Physiological biometrics measure a specific part of the structure or shape of a portion of
a subjects body [17]. Whereas, behavioural biometrics are more focused on how one does
something.
The advantage of employing physical biometrics is that they provide a higher accuracy
as compared to behavioural biometrics [1, 23, 24]. However, physical biometric sensor
devices have to be implemented and this increases the cost of implementation which is
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a limitation. Behavioural biometrics serve as one of the popular techniques in contin-
uous authentication of persons, but it yields inadequate accuracy due to the fact that
behaviour is not stable and it changes over time [24, 9]. Figure 2.3 shows the two classes













Figure 2.3: The two classes of biometrics and their examples.
2.1.3.1 Operation of a Biometric System
A biometric system is in essence a pattern recognition system that employs a sensor to
obtain biometric data from a subject, extracts the main features from the data, compares
the obtained feature set against the reference feature set(s) stored in the database, and
makes a decision based on the outcome of the comparison [19]. Thus, the operation of a
biometric authentication system consists of four main stages [19, 9]:
 Data acquisition: Capturing the user’s biometric data from the sensor module.
Used during user enrollment and also during verification or identification.
 Feature extraction: Extracting information from the raw biometric data. This done
by having an optimum feature set that can uniquely represent users.
 Matching: Comparison between the feature set provided during an authentication
session with the biometric template that was constructed during enrollment.
 Decision rule: A rule or set of rules that take into account the outcome of the
matching phase and determine whether the user is legitimate or not.
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This system works in two phases: enrollment; and verification or identification. During
enrollment, the user’s biometric template is stored in the database for future reference
and during verification the provided user template is compared against the reference
template in the system’s database. It is required that the user provides their biographical
information which will be used to link the user with his/her biometric data [19, 17, 25].
Figure 2.4 shows functional block diagrams of both enrollment and verification processes























Ver i ficat ion
Figure 2.4: Functional block diagrams of the enrollment and verification phases of a
biometric system.
2.1.3.2 Properties of a Biometric System
Jain et al. [26] state seven properties that determine the suitability of a physical or
behavioural characteristic to be used as a biometric measure in a biometric application:
1. Universality: Everyone should possess the biometric measure.
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2. Uniqueness: The measure should discriminate between two people which implies
that no two people can have the same biometric feature set.
3. Permanence: The trait should be invariant over a period time with respect to the
matching algorithm. However, behavioural biometrics change slightly with time.
4. Collectability: The data collection process should be quantitatively measureable.
5. Performance: The biometric system should be accurate to some degree of accuracy
that is acceptable.
6. Acceptability: The target population should be willing to accept the measure and
share their biometric data.
7. Circumvention: The measure should not be easily imitated or mimicked in case of
physical or behavioural traits respectively.
2.1.3.3 Performance of a Biometric System
Unlike PIN-Password based systems, where there should be an exact match between the
stored PIN or password and the provided numeric or alphanumeric string in order to val-
idate a subject’s identity, a biometric system rarely encounters two samples of a subject’s
biometric trait that result in exactly the same feature set [19, 17]. This is caused by a
number of factors, such as imperfect sensing conditions (e.g., noisy biometric data due
to sensor malfunction), changes in the subject’s biometric trait (e.g., a person’s typing
rythym changes with time) and variations in how the subject interacts with the sensor
device (e.g., partial fingerprints) [19].
The performance of a biometric system is evaluated based on the errors committed by
the system. Two types of error are at the core of evaluating the effectiveness of a bio-
metric system: Type I and Type II which are False Positive (FP) and False Negative
(FN) respectively. A Type I error is observed when an impostor is wrongly classified as
a genuine user and a Type II error occurs when genuine user is denied access [19, 8, 27].
Using the FP and FN a number of performance metrics can be computed with the aim
of giving a clear picture of how well a biometric system can execute task of identification
or verification. These evaluation metrics are summarized as follows:
1. False Acceptance Rate (FAR): Percentage ratio between falsely rejected genuine
subjects against the total number of genuine subjects in the system [19, 27]. This
indicator is based on the Type II error. Sometimes referred to as False Non-Match
Rate (FNMR) or False Rejection Rate (FRR) [19].
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2. Impostor Pass Rate (IPR): Percentage ratio between falsely accepted unauthorized
subjects against the total number of imposters attempting to access the system
[27]. This indicator is based on the Type I error. In some literature the Impostor
Pass Rate (IPR) is referred to as False Match Rate (FMR) or the False Acceptance
Rate (FAR)2 [19, 27].
3. Equal Error Rate (EER): The value at which the False Alarm Rate (FAR) is equal
to the IPR when FAR and IPR are plotted on the same plot. This metric is used
to determine the overall accuracy of the system and as a performance measure to
compare biometric systems [8, 27]. In other literature this indicator is stated as
Crossover Error Rate (CER) [25].
4. Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) Curve: A plot of FAR against IPR on a
linear, logarithmic or semi-logarithmic scale [19]. The FAR, IPR and EER values
can be read obtained directly from this plot [27].
In an ideal authentication system, the FAR and IPR are both equal to zero. In the real
world, these errors occur and they have a trade-off; a low FAR implies that less rejection
and easy access for the genuine user, however, this means that impostors can also gain
access easily provided the can mimic a genuine user to an acceptable degree. To remedy
this, the FAR can be reduced so that imposters do not gain easy access, however, this
will lead to genuine users being rejected. Thus FAR and IPR have to be selected in a
way the prohibits unauthorized access but does not reject authorized users. Hempstalk
[27] argues that it is more acceptable to have a security system that rejects genuine users
every now and then than one which grants impostors easy access.
2.1.4 Combination of Authentication Schemes
The aforementioned authentication schemes can be combined in order to increase the
security of systems thus giving rise to multi-factor authentication security systems. In
most cases, biometrics are used to supplement knowledge and posession based authentican
schemes in order to add an addtional level of security [19]. The most common example
is the combination of two schemes which is known as Two Factor Authentication (2FA)
[19]. Examples of 2FA include an Automated Teller Machine (ATM) which requires a
PIN (what the subject knows) and a bank card (what the subject possess) for a user
to perform transactions. More robust ATMs have been implemented which use all the
the three criterion mentioned above by adding a biometric recognition feature by either
2To avoid confusion and for consistency sake we will use FAR to only refer to the False Alarm Rate
and not the False Acceptance Rate.
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face, fingerprint or retina (what the subject is) [28, 29]. Combining these authentication
factors results in more robust security systems and thus making it hard to compromise
the security of systems that employ mutli-factor authentication techniques.
2.2 Keystroke Dynamics
2.2.1 Features
While typing, the computer can record the key pressed, the time it was pressed and the
the time at which it was released. From this raw typing data, KSD timing features can
be extracted as shown in Figure 2.5.
Legend:
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Figure 2.5: Timing features that can be extracted from two successive keystrokes, ’A’
and ’B’ where P i and Ri denote the key press and key release time stamps of the first
and second keys respectively. The superscript i denotes the position of a keystroke in the
sequence of keys typed in from the input stream.
1. Hold time (th): The time between pressing and releasing a key. In other words,
how long was the key held. It sometimes referred to as key-down time, dwell time
or key duration. The hold time can be calculated as
tih = R
i − P i (2.1)
2. Key-up-to-key-down time (tud)
3: The time between the key press event of the sec-
ond key and the key release of the first key. The key-up-to-key-down time can be
3tud and tuu may be negative if the key release events of the earlier key occur after the key press and







3. Key-down-to-key-down time (tdd): The time difference between the key press of the
second key and the key press of the first key. The key-down-to-key-down time can
be calculated as
tidd = P
i+1 − P i (2.3)
4. Key-up-to-key-up time (tuu)
3: The time difference between release of the second
key and the release of the first key. The key-up-to-key-up time can be calculated as
tiuu = R
i+1 −Ri (2.4)
5. Key-down-to-key-up time (tdu): The time difference between the second key release
and the key press of the first key. The key-down-to-key-up time can be calculated
as
tidu = R
i+1 − P i (2.5)
In addition to the aforementioned timing features, two keycode based features were em-
ployed, fki and tkj; where fki is the keycode of the current key and tkj is the keycode
of the successive key. These keycodes are related to the timing features. fki is tied with
th, using these two features one can deduce how long a particular key was held down.
fki and tkj are related to the inter-key timing features, using this set of features one can
determine the subject’s travel times between two keys with fki as the initial point and
tkj as the destination.
Teh et al. [8] refer to features 2 through 5 (inter-key times) as flight times of different
types, namely, type 1 through type 4 respectively. According to the survey of keystroke
dynamics biometrics by [8], the most used features are flight times at 49% followed by
hold time at 41% and pressure and other features take up the remaining 10%. There exists
other features, although uncommon, such as keystroke pressure, typing error frequency,
sound of typing and size of the finger which have been used [30, 31].
2.2.2 Benefits and Challenges
Every class of biometrics has its advantages and disadvantages. It can be argued that
biometric measures based on physical characteristics have fewer challenges as compared
to behavioural biometrics. In this subsection the benefits and challenges faced when
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working with free-text keystroke dynamics will be discussed with reference to some of
the biometric properties mentioned in Section 2.1.3.2. Some of the advantages of include
[8, 22]:
 Biometric scheme is inexpensive as compared to other biometrics since an existing
computer keyboard is used as an input device thus there are no additional costs for
the sensor device.
 Less obtrusive and does not disturb the user while he/she is performing tasks.
 Offer both static and continuous authentication. The ability of KSD to provide
continuous authentication without continuously prompting the user to provide au-
thentication data gives it an upper hand on other biometric schemes.
 A keystroke event is measured with ms precision which provides fine granularity
thereby yielding a high degree of uniqueness. This makes it impossible for two
subjects to have the same template which limits mimicry thus resulting in high
uniqueness and high circumvention.
The disadvantages of working with keystroke analysis include [8, 22]:
 Behavioural biometrics change over time as one’s behaviour cannot be exactly the
same at all times, thus this scheme has low permanence. Due to the changing
behaviour the user template may have to be updated regularly.
 User’s typing signature may be affected by the user’s mental and physical conditions
(mood, fatigue, physical injuries on the hands).
 The typing pattern may be influenced by the hardware. For example, typing on
desktop keyboard may yield different results compared to typing on a laptop key-
board.
2.3 Conclusion
This chapter introduced the basic theory and background of the field of biometrics and
user authentication in computer security with an emphasis on keystroke dynamics. An
overview of how biometric systems work was presented together with the metrics used to
evaluate the performance of biometrics-based security systems. Lastly, the fundamental
features used in keystroke dynamics and the benefits and challenges associated with the




Data collection in keystroke dynamics is not a difficult task, since no extra hardware is
needed and keyboards are standard input devices for most computer systems. Logging
keystrokes requires software to monitor key events on the keyboard and log the data.
When collecting keystroke data, the user needs not to interact with the data logging
software in any special way; they can just do their computer-based tasks as per usual.
However, accurately collecting keystroke data is challenging as there are technical and
ethical issues that have to be taken into consideration. If not properly addressed, these
issues can tamper with the integrity of the collected data. Some these issues include the
type of text, keyboard specifications and layout, and environmental conditions.
This chapter details the process of collecting data and how the technical and ethical
issues surrounding the data collection were addressed. Section 3.2 provides a detailed de-
scription of how the final dataset was constructed. The collection of a free-text real-world
dataset is one of the main contributions of this dissertation.
3.1 Collecting Data
There are various methodologies that can be followed when collecting keystroke data.
The choice of the methodology may be influenced by the application in which KSD is
being applied and the aims of the research. The following are the main questions that
one needs to answer before starting with keystroke data collection:
 Artificial or real-world scenario?
 Free-text or fixed-text?
 What to record?
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 Restricted or unrestricted collection?
The considerations that have to be made in order to answer these questions are discussed
in the paragraphs that follow.
Ideally, data used for typist authentication would come from real-world recording where
users are recorded as they perform their usual typing activities. However, due to security,
trust and ethical issues it is not easy to convince a user to allow for their keystrokes to be
recorded whilst they are busy with their typing activities. This is due to the fact that it
is most likely that confidential data will be logged. The main benefit of monitoring real
behaviour is that the user is unlikely to be affected by the limitation of an artificial task
which is the unwillingness to continue partaking in the data collection experiment. It is
common in studies where data is collected in an artificial setting for users to be unwilling
as being part of the experiment may be a time consuming task whereas in a real-world
scenario the user is in some way compelled to perform the typing tasks. This limitation
results in a dataset consisting of too little data, as evident in Nisenson et al.’s dataset [32].
The question of free-text or fixed-text mainly depends on the application in which
keystroke dynamics is being applied. In free-text data analysis, the sequence of keys
and the length of keystrokes are not known as opposed to fixed-text analysis where a
known key sequence with fixed length is expected. As alluded before, free-text analysis
is typically suited where continuous authentication is the objective and where the user
is typing in data into the system very frequently. On the other hand, fixed-text analysis
is employed to make conventional authentication methods like PINs and passwords more
robust at the initiation of a session.
When coming to the question of which parameters to log, issues of security and trust
always arise especially for applications where there is sensitive personal data such as
passwords and e-mails. With keystroke data logging unfortunately, the data entered into
hidden password fields can be logged together with deleted data. Furthermore, the origi-
nal text data can be regenerated by mapping the recorded keycodes to their corresponding
characters and in some studies the raw text data is stored as well, an example of this is
[27] where logging was performed in an e-mail client software. The aim of anonymous
data collection is to ensure that the recorded parameters cannot be associated with the
identity of the actual participant. Additionally, working with sensitive personal data
required researchers to take strict data handling and processing measures to ensure the
user’s confidential data is well protected. In [27], the recorded e-mails were screened and
confidential text data was deleted. Lastly, the choice of recorded parameters may limit
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the usage of a dataset, this is seen in the case of GP’s dataset [33] in which key release
events were not recorded which implies that the hold-time feature cannot be calculated
and thus may prevent parties interested in using the hold-time feature from using the
dataset. In most studies that took place post GP’s study, both key press and release
events are recorded which addresses the limitation of GP’s dataset [27, 34, 22, 35, 36].
Inputting data into the computer from the keyboard is required by various computer pro-
grams which include text editors, web browsers and games. This means that keystrokes
can be monitored across a multitude of applications thus some studies exploit this by
implementing unrestricted data loggers that record all keyboard events that are triggered
in the operating system [35, 37, 38, 39]. Most studies however, restrict the monitoring of
keystrokes to a specific platform for example within a text editor or web browser.
In this study, the keystroke data was collected in a real-world setting on free-text in-
put and the collection was restricted within the text-area of the in-browser code editor.
The next section discusses the process of collecting keystroke data in Moodle’s Virtual
Programming Lab (VPL) plugin.
3.1.1 Recording Keystroke Data on Moodle’s VPL
In February of 2019, 283 second year engineering students at the University of Johannes-
burg who took a computer programming course offered by the Department of Electrical
and Electronic Engineering Science gave consent to participate in a keystroke dynamics
research study, thereby agreeing for their keystroke data to be logged whilst they per-
formed given computer coding tasks on the course site. The course was published on
Moodle, which is an open-source Course Management System (CMS) aimed at providing
stakeholders in education with a single robust, secure and integrated system to create
personalised learning environments [3]. The data collection was performed on two sep-
arate Moodle sites, namely the practice site and the assessment site. The practice site
ran for a period of 15 weeks, from 20 February 2019 till 6 June 2019 and the assessment
site ran for a period of 12 weeks, from 14 March 2019 till 6 June 2019. For a detailed
schedule for the data collection particularly on the assessment site consult Appendix A.
The data collection happened in both controlled and uncontrolled environments where
the controlled scenario was observed during the assessments and the uncontrolled setting
was observed when participants attempted the practice questions on their own. During
assessments, identical computers and keyboards were used to prevent any variations in
the hardware and all the computers ran Windows. This was not difficult to achieve as
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the assessments were performed in one of the university’s computer labs and the teaching
assistants were there to supervise and ensure that the set rules were adhered to by the
participants. An assessment session ran for an hour and three sessions were conducted
on each assessment day. Each student could only book a single session a week, therefore,
each student was afforded at least 10 assessment opportunities in total. The opposite was
true for when the participants did work on the practice site because they could access it
any given place and time, so they could use their own desktops or laptops. Additionally,
it was observed during tutorial sessions where the participants used the practice site,
that students assisted each other and the teaching assistants also assisted here and there.
This assistance was sometimes in the form of typing a line of code or two. This meant
that some participants provided typing samples for online profiles that do not belong to
them.
Since the course was about computer programming, an open-source plugin for Moodle,
the VPL by [40] was employed to manage the programming assignments in Moodle, which
includes the editing, running and evaluation of programs written by students. The VPL
uses Ace, an open-source embeddable code editor written in JavaScript that runs in a
browser and has syntax highlighting for more than 110 computer programming languages
[41]. The data logging software was implemented to log the keystroke events triggered in
the code editor’s text field on a Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) form using client-
side JavaScript (JS). When the keydown and keyup events were triggered, the times1
of the events together with the keycode of the key were recorded; the text that was typed
in by the participant was not recorded. The collected keystrokes were then saved to a
.csv2 file when the user hit the “save” button. All this took place in the background
while a participant was attempting to solve a given computer coding challenge.
Every time when the participant hit the “save” button to save his/her code, the log-
ger wrote all the recorded keystrokes to a user specific .csv file. The filename was
created using the pre-fix “user ”, followed by the user ID which is used to uniquely iden-
tify each user on the site and a timestamp to ensure uniqueness for each file thus resulting
in a filename in this form “user userid timestamp”. For example a file with the filename
“user 1 1537707461.6787524.csv” would mean that the data file belongs to participant #
1, the file has a timestamp of 1537707461.6787524 and its file extension is .csv. The
contents of the file are organised in a tabular format which consists of three columns with
1The time of the key events was obtained using the built-in JS function Date.now(). The function
returns the number of milliseconds since January 1, 1970 00:00:00 UTC.
2.csv- Comma-Separated Values (CSV) is a file type for a plain text file that contains a list of data
arranged in a tabular format where a comma or semi-colon is used as a delimiter.
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the following headings: press time, release time and key code, respectively. The contents
of a raw keystroke data file are arranged in this form:











Each row in the example above represents one keystroke which is composed of a press-
time, release-time and the keycode of the key that was pressed. The values are separated
by commas. Each very large number is the timestamp, which is time in ms when a
corresponding key was pressed or released. The number of rows in a data file is de-
termined by the number of keys a participant presses before hitting the “save” button.
In the above example, key ’I’ (keycode = 73) was pressed at 1537707376524 and re-
leased at 1537707376530, the second key ’O’ (keycode = 79) was pressed 1537707376621-
1537707376530 ms later, and so on.
3.1.2 Technical Issues
Technical issues are quite a challenge, especially when collecting data in an uncontrolled
setting. The remedies to most the issues that arise are careful programming and setting
strict rules for the participants of the experiment. An additional remedy used to limit
these issues in a controlled setup is, supervision, which is impossible to achieve for most
real-world data collection scenarios. In this study a bit of both worlds was experienced,
since data was collected on the assessment site which is only accessible in the university
computer labs at a set time and on the practice site which is available to participants at
any time.
The variations that were introduced by the uncontrolled setting gave rise to some of
the technical issues discussed in the sections to follow.
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3.1.2.1 Keyboard Layout
In this study, the computer keyboard of choice was the QWERTY3 (US) keyboard layout
as shown in Figure 3.1. The reason for choosing this layout was that it is the most
used layout in South Africa and the world as a whole which made it the most viable
layout compared to other existing QWERTY layouts and non-QWERTY layouts such
as AZERTY and Dvorak respectively, to name but a few. The US and UK QWERTY
variations have minor differences, for example, the UK one consists of 62 keys whereas the
UK version has only 61 keys, on the typewriter keys [42]. Another noticeable difference
is that, the Enter key on the UK version spans two rows and on the US version it only
spans one row [42]. The effects of the mentioned differences on ones typing behaviour
















































































































































































































































Vendor keys (Windows only- not  compat ible with Mac, ...). Addt ionally, not  all Windows keyboards contain a right  Windows key.
Pr i nt  Scr een has unknown consistency. Addit ionally, key may or may not  fire keydown , keypress and keyup events.
Legend:
Figure 3.1: QWERTY keyboard layout with keycodes.
3.1.2.2 Browser
In order to determine the keycodes of each key on the keyboard the logging software was
programmed to log the keycodes of the pressed keys on the console of the browser. Each
key on the keyboard was then pressed and its corresponding keycode was recorded; then
Figure 3.1 was created which is a mapping of each keyboard key and its corresponding
keycode. To verify if the keycodes of all the keys were consistent across all major browsers,
the same process of determine keycodes was followed but using different major browsers
such as Chrome, Internet Explorer (IE), Firefox, Opera and Safari. After checking for
consistency of keycodes across different browsers it was observed that the key-to-keycode
3The QWERTY computer keyboard layout has two variations, the United States (US) and the United
Kingdom (UK).
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mappings were consistent. Furthermore, the Print Screen key had an undefined
press-time and a defined release-time, which was consistent on Chrome, Firefox, Safari
and Opera whereas in IE the key did not fire at all. The cause of this may be that the
keydown event of this key has been suppressed on the browsers that were tested. In the
case of using the IE, both the keydown and keyup events did not fire. Lastly, to ensure
that accurate keycodes are obtained, measures were taken when programming the data
logger to have it to work consistently across the mentioned major browsers.
3.1.2.3 Ace Code Editor
When using the Ace code editor, the keydown events of the following keys: Backspace,
Tab, Page Up, Page Down, End, Home, Left Arrow, Up Arrow, Right Arrow,
Down Arrow, Print Screen, Insert and Delete did not trigger, however the
keyup events did trigger. This behaviour resulted in all the mentioned keys to have
an undefined press-time and a defined release-time. This challenge was due to how the
keydown events for the keys were handled by the code editor; instead of using the default
browser event handlers the developers implemented their own event handlers for the listed
keys. To overcome this challenge edits were made in the default ace.js file which contained
the main JS code for running the editor. When examining the code it was found that
the default event handling was suppressed by making the event handler to return false
and/or by calling event.preventDefault() and event.stopPropagation().
To overcome this challenge, the keydown event listener of the keystroke logger was im-
plemented in the ace.js file before the code that prevented the events from triggering.
3.1.3 Ethical Issues
Since the study involved the collection and use of personal behavioural data, measures
were taken to ensure that the data collection process is executed ethically. The first step
in this quest was to apply and obtain ethical clearance from the University of Johan-
nesburg where the study was conducted. An informed consent form that provided the
purpose of the study, a detailed description the data collected and measures that would
be taken to protect participants and their personal data, was created on the course site
and made accessible for every student who took the programming course. The data that
was used in this study was that of the students who gave consent.
It is of paramount importance that all the ethical issues are addressed before the dataset
is utilized. Furthermore, the dataset cannot be shared with any party attempting to repli-
cate the study if it contains sensitive personal information. The e-mail address provided
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by the participant during registration was solely used for the purpose of identification
when accessing the site and it shall not be shared or released publicly to ensure con-
fidentiality and anonymity. To identify the various participants within the study, each
participant was given a unique ID when they registered on the site. This ID is not in
any way linked to the personal information (e-mail address) provided by the participant.
Lastly, the data logger was limited only to the code editor, this was done to prevent log-
ging of the participants’ sensitive data such as their emails and passwords. This makes
sense since the focus of this study is not on static authentication or password hardening
but rather on dynamic keystroke analysis.
Most participants were hesitant to partake in the study even though assurance was given
that the use of their keystroke data in the study would not affect their academics in any
way, thus some students chose not to participate and the others opted to stop participat-
ing in the study after some time. The main reason for this was that some students felt
and thought that the usage of their typing data and the experimental findings may be
used to implicate and defame them.
Lastly, the results obtained and the observations made in this study will not be used
to implicate the participants. There will not be any form of discrimination of partici-
pants, all the collected from all the participants shall be used. All efforts shall be made
to ensure that the participants are protected from any potential harm with regards to
their reputation and that of their institution.
3.2 Final Dataset
Table 3.1: Numerical summary of our datasets.
Dataset Users No. Keystrokes Avg. Keystrokes/User
Practice 283 6M 21,000
Assessment 270 3M 11,000
Table 3.1 gives a numerical summary of the outcomes of the data collection process. Of
the 323 potential participants, 283 consented, 31 declined and 9 abstained. The data
samples of the 31 students who declined to be part of the study were removed from
the final dataset. Of the 283 participants who consented, 13 did not sit for assessments
thereby leaving 270 participants who provided typing samples on the test site. From
the practice site, just above six million keystrokes were recorded from 283 participants
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over the data collection period with a each participant providing approximately 21,000
keystrokes on average and the most prolific participant providing 129,436 keystrokes.
From the assessment site, just above three million keystrokes were recorded with an
average of 300,000 keystrokes per session and each participant providing approximately
11,000 keystrokes on average.
3.2.1 Dataset Description
The complete dataset is packaged in two .csv files, one containing keystroke data col-
lected from the practice site and the other with data collected from the test site. The file
structure of both files is the same and is arranged as follows:
 The data is arranged in tabular form with 4 columns.
 The first column, user id, is an unique identifier for each participant, ranging from
1 to 283.
 The second and third columns store the timestamps at which press and release
events were triggered, respectively.
 The last column is for the keycode.
Consider the following example of how the contents of the data files are arranged:







The example above presents keystroke data from participant #3. The first key which this
participant typed was the Left-Arrow key (keycode = 37) and the key was pressed at
time 1537707376524 and released 6ms later at time 1537707376524. The second key that
the user typed is the Enter key which was pressed at time 1537707376621, 91ms after
the Left-Arrow was released, and so on.
3.3 Conclusion
This chapter presented the data collection methodology followed in this dissertation. The
chapter also touched on various technical and ethical issues encountered during the data
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collection phase and how they were addressed. The chapter was concluded by presenting




In this chapter attention will be drawn to the analysis of the dataset that has been con-
structed as explained in the previous chapter. The analysis includes the pre-processing of
the raw keystroke data such as performing outlier removal and various data transforma-
tions. The extraction of timing information used to create the features will be discussed
together with other non-timing features that are going to be used. An analysis of the
features will be performed whereby an investigation will be carried out to determine the
most important features for this application, this will be done in Section 4.2.4. Addi-
tionally, reasons and motivation will be given as to why the chosen features were selected
over the other available ones.
4.1 Raw Data Pre-Processing
Pre-processing was performed on the raw keystroke data in order to prepare the data for
feature extraction. Two operations were performed on the data, which are: the removal
of erroneous data points and sorting. The data logger software module was implemented
to return a value of -1 for keys that have undefined press or release times; thus data rows




Figure 4.1: Overlapping key sequence of two keys.
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Consider the scenario shown in Figure 4.1 and assume that “Key 1” is a modifier key
and “Key 2” is one of the typewriter keys on the keyboard. If a typist wants to type
the character ’#’, they would typically follow the key sequence shown in Figure 4.1 and
“Key 1” would correspond to Shift (keycode = 16) and “Key 2” to ’3’ (keycode =
51). From observing the sequence as depicted in the figure it is evident that P1 is lesser
than P2, however a keystroke can only be logged successfully after the keyup event
of that particular key has been fired. For this reason, in the data file the data row
of ’3’ would appear before that of Shift even though Shift was pressed first. This
called for a second operation on the raw data. This operation involved sorting data
rows in ascending order using the key press-time. Performing the sort is important as
it preserves the original sequence of the keys; not performing the sort would result in
incorrect calculations of the inter-key time features.
4.2 Features
In this section, the information extracted from the data will be discussed. This section’s
pre-requisite is Section 2.2 which gives a theoretical background on the timing features
and the mathematics involved in extracting them. The equations used to calculate the
features have been restated below, for the sake of easy referencing.
tih = R








i+1 − P i (2.5)
4.2.1 Extraction
Feature extraction is the process of making meaning of the collected data– the generation
of information from raw data. Using the parameters recorded during data collection, i.e.,
press-time, release-time and keycode, the KSD features were extracted. The timing fea-
tures were computed by applying (2.1) through (2.5) to the press and release timestamps.
The keycode values were taken as they are from the data file, no calculations were made
to extract them. The extracted features were then stored to construct feature vectors as
shown below where V is a vector and the subscript is the feature contained by the vector:
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where the position of a particular key event or character in the input stream is
denoted by n. The size of the feature vector is n+ 1.
















































6. The generated Vfk feature vector is as follows:
Vfk =
{
fk0, fk1, fk2, ..., fkn
}
(4.6)
7. The generated Vtk feature vector is as follows:
Vtk =
{
tk0, tk1, tk2, ..., tkn
}
(4.7)
The size of the inter-key time vectors, 4.2 through 4.5 is one less than the size of Vth
due to the fact that the first key in the typing sequence would not have inter-key times;
therefore the inter-key time values of the first key in the input stream vectors should be
removed, this is to ensure that all the feature vectors are of the same size. Additionally,
for the first key in the input stream, tk0 = fk0.
4.2.2 Outlier Detection and Treatment
When a person is typing, they do not type at constant speeds throughout and they are
most likely to take pauses during the act. These pauses maybe attributed to thinking
time and other interruptions. These pauses translate to high valued inter-key times. An-
other scenario is when a person types in a word they are used to typing, here muscle
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memory comes into play and the person types in the word with ease which translates
to low valued hold times and inter-key times. These timing values that are either too
large or too small are outliers and they do not necessarily reflect the user’s actual typing
behaviour. An outlier detection and treatment process was employed to handle such data
points.
There are numerous outlier detection taxonomies, the most basic being the extreme-value
analysis1. This group of outlier detection methods is applicable to 1-dimensional data
and the key is determining minimum and maximum bounds to separate inlying points
from the outlying ones as shown in Figures 4.2 and 4.3. In the subsequent sub-subsections
the outlier detection methods explored in this dissertation are discussed together with
some of their benefits and drawbacks.
4.2.2.1 Standard Deviation Method
This method2 can be employed given that the distribution of the values in the sample is
Gaussian or Gaussian-like, we can use statistical measures, namely, the standard deviation
and the mean of the sample to compute the bounds used to identify outliers. This method
exploits the property of the Guassian distribution that the standard deviation from the
mean can be used to summarize the percentage of the values in the sample. An outlier
is then a data point xm that lies outside the bounds, i.e.:
xm < µ− kσ ∪ xm > µ+ kσ (4.8)
where:
µ is the mean of the sample.
σ is the standard deviation of the sample.
k is a constant that denotes the number of standard deviations from the mean.
1Refer to [43] for a comprehensive discussion of outlier detection methods and theory relating to
outliers and their analysis.
2An equivalent of this method is using the standardised Gaussian which has a mean of zero and
standard deviation of unity (µ = 0, σ = 1). This version uses the z -score to compute the bounds.
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Figure 4.2: Mean and standard deviation outlier detection method.
When using this method the common practice is selecting a k value of 2 or 3 which pre-
serves 95.5% and 99.7% of the values, respectively. What makes this method attractive
is that it is easy to understand and implement, however, it suffers from one main draw-
back. The drawback is that the outlying values are also included in the calculation of
the bounds which means that these extreme values influence the position of the bounds
therefore making the method less robust on outliers. Moreover, this method assumes that
the timing data follows a Gaussian distribution which may not always be true as timing
data is more likely to follow a Rayleigh distribution.
4.2.2.2 Interquartile Range Method
Not all data is Gaussian or Gaussian-like, a good statistic for summarising non-Gaussian
data is the Interquartile Range (IQR). The IQR is calculated by computing the difference
between the 75th and the 25th percentiles of the data. Using the IQR, we can define bounds
on the sample values that are a factor k of the IQR below and above the 25th and the
75th percentiles, respectively. An outlier is then a data point xm that lies outside the
bounds, i.e.:
xm < Q1− k × IQR ∪ xm > Q3 + k × IQR (4.9)
where:
IQR = Q3−Q1
k is the IQR multiplier.
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Median Q3Q1 Maximum




Figure 4.3: IQR outlier detection method.
Compared to the standard deviation method, the IQR outlier detection method is more
robust to outliers as it uses statistical measures that do not include extreme values to
calculate bounds.
Outlier detection is followed by treatment– what to do with the outliers. Outliers can
be treated in one of two ways, namely, elimination or replacement. When using elimi-
nation as a remedy, the detected outliers are removed from the dataset and in the case
of replacement, the outlying data points are replaced with a certain value, usually the
mean or median score. In applications where there is limited data points the most viable
outlier treatment would be replacement, however, where there is abundant data points
removal is usually the solution.
Based on the discussions presented in this section, for this dissertation, the IQR based
technique was used for outlier detection due to its robustness on outliers. With regard to
outlier treatment, all the detected outliers were removed from the dataset reason being
that replacing outliers with the mean, median or any other value would be artificially
creating the user’s typing behaviour which may distort the user’s actual behaviour.
4.2.3 Scaling
Feature scaling3 is a technique used to standardise the range of independent variables or
features of data. Feature scaling is a very important step during feature pre-processing
especially when the features are of varying magnitudes. This pre-processing step may
3Feature scaling is relevant to continuous variables therefore it was only applied on the timing data.
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vary the results when using distance-based algorithms or algorithms that assume normal-
ity and have a little or no effect in tree-based algorithms as they can handle features of
varying magnitudes. Due to the algorithms employed in this dissertation, feature scaling
is necessary because hold times are typically less than a second whereas inter-key times
are usually a couple of seconds therefore feature scaling is necessary so that all features
are on the same level, magnitude-wise.
There are four commonly used scaling methods, namely, standardisation, mean normali-
sation, min-max scaling and scaling to unit length. The standardisation scaling technique
is presented here as it was was employed in this study4. Feature standardisation makes
values of each feature to have a mean of zero and unit standard deviation. This is achieved
by replacing each sample point, xm, within a particular feature vector by its z -score, zm,






µ is the mean of the feature vector.
σ is the standard deviation of the feature vector.
4.2.4 Dimension Reduction
Dimension reduction is a technique used to reduce the dimension of used features (the
number of features used). This technique transforms a set of features, Voriginal, to a new
set of features, Vnew, where Vnew < Voriginal [45]. This can be achieved by manually
examining the features and selecting only the most informative ones. An alternative is
employing algorithms that take in the original features as input to produce new features
with more or similar informative power. Some of the algorithms that may be employed for
this task include the Principal Component Analysis (PCA), Linear Discriminant Analysis
(LDA) and Autoencoders (AE), to mention but a few. One main drawback with using this
approach of dimension reduction is that unlike the original features, the newly generated
features may not be interpretable by humans. However, to the computer these new
features will have more or less the same ability to train learning agents. Some of the
advantages of dimension reduction include [45, 46]:
 Elimination of highly correlated and redundant features.
 Less computing resources are used as space and memory required to store data is
reduced due to the decrease in the dimensionality.
4Refer to [44] for a discussion of the other mentioned scaling techniques.
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 Reduced training times for learning agents.
 Dimension reduction to two or three dimensional spaces makes it easier to visualise
the data as humans can only interpret plots up to three dimensions.
PCA5 was applied on the timing features to ensure that any heavily correlated features are
eliminated as they introduce unneeded redundancies. Figure 4.4 shows the information
contained in the PCA generated features. From the plot it can be observed that the
4th and 5th principal components contain almost no information therefore the dimension
of the timing features was reduced from 5D to 3D while still preserving almost all the
information.
































Information Per Principal Component
Figure 4.4: Explained variance per principal component which shows the amount of
information stored in the principal components.
Instead of using the original timing features, the PCA generated features were used. The
features that contributed the most in terms of information content are: th, tud and tdd (in
order of importance). The other two inter-key timing features have negligible information
content because they are they are well correlated with the other timing features. To
further demonstrate the need of dimension reduction, linear combinations of equations
2.1 through 2.5 were taken in order to determine the equation(s) that are correlated.
5This algorithm assumes data normality therefore the input data was scaled as explained in Section
4.2.3.
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From this investigation, the following observations were made:
(2.1) + (2.2) = (2.3)
Ri − P i + P i+1 −Ri = P i+1 − P i
(2.1) + (2.4) = (2.5)
Ri − P i +Ri+1 −Ri = Ri+1 − P i
(2.3) + (2.4) = (2.2) + (2.5)
P i+1 − P i +Ri+1 −Ri = P i+1 −Ri +Ri+1 − P i
The linear combinations listed above corroborate the results achieved using the PCA
regarding the most useful/informative features.
4.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, the data processing procedures employed were presented which included
the raw data pre-processing, feature extraction and outlier detection and treatment where
various methods were explored and the optimal one selected. Furthermore, dimension
reduction by means of the PCA was employed to remove redundant features.
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Detection and Elimination of
Common Typist Traits using
OC-SVM
In this chapter1, we propose a method of detecting and eliminating typing traits that are
common amongst users in a dataset using a machine learning based novelty detection
algorithm.
The remainder of this chapter is arranged as follows. The immediate section to fol-
low provides an introduction and discusses the motivation behind the work. In Section
5.2.1, we present the theory of one-class classification and the One-Class Support Vec-
tor Machines (OC-SVM) algorithm which was used to devise the proposed approach.
In Section 5.3, we discuss the operation of the suggested approach. In Section 5.4, we
present the experimental method followed to test the suggested approach together with
the evaluation metric used, the results obtained and their discussion. This chapter will
then end of with remarks– the strengths and shortcomings of the proposed approach.
5.1 Introduction and Background
When analysing the typing data that was used in our study, it was noted that there are
common digraphs that most users type. For example, the top ten most typed digraphs
are (in descending order): Backspace Backspace, Right-Arrow Right-Arrow,
Left-Arrow Left-Arrow, Shift 9 (to produce ‘(’), in, Down-Arrow Down-Arrow,
nt, Up-Arrow Up-Arrow, ; Enter and t Space. It is worth noting that the
Backspace Backspace digraph was typed approximately three times more than the
1The work presented in this chapter was published in [47].
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second most typed digraph. Majority of the most typed digraphs are unprintable char-
acters and they would typically be attributed to the editing of free-text.
Combined, the top three most typed digraphs accounted for 15% of all the data that
was collected. Given that the keystrokes were collected while users were typing computer
code it makes sense that the keystrokes that dominate are those associated with editing
of text because when coding one usually has to debug and make corrections to their
code. Additionally, the participants are novice computer programmers and majority are
unskilled typists, therefore making them prone to typing errors compared to someone who
is a seasoned programmer and/or typist. Of importance is that the unprintable charac-
ters may not necessarily reflect the users typing behaviour as they occur as a result of
the user holding down the key for extended periods of time. The KSD that dominate
in this situation are actually the repetition rate of the operating system, not the typing
behaviour of the user.
According to information theory, observing an event that has a low probability of oc-
curring is more informative compared to observing an event that has a high probability
of occurring, this concept is referred to as information entropy [48]. Therefore, using
these common digraph as features would be ineffective as they are not good discriminat-
ing features for a typist since they occur amongst a lot of subjects thus making them
less informative. To improve classification performance, these common features should
be ignored/removed as they carry little to no information.
In Information Retrieval (IR) particularly the sub-field of text retrieval, words that occur
in all or most documents in the collection are usually discarded as they are regarded to
have little or no discriminatory power. This is achieved by developing a list of all words
that are used excessively in a language [49]. For example, stop words in the English lan-
guage include “is”, “in”, “the” and “a”, to mention but a few. In text retrieval literature
these words are known as stop words and a list of stop words is referred to as a stop list.
When performing text processing in text retrieval systems such as search engines and
document classifiers, any words that appears in the stop list are ignored when querying
results or performing classification. By so doing, the focus is given to the keywords that
are presented in the provided text. An additional benefit of the removal of stop words is
that it helps save storage space and processing time.
Currently in KSD literature, not a lot of attention has been given to investigating how
commonly typed n-graphs affect the performance of keystroke analysis algorithms. Most
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algorithms proposed in literature work on the idea that people are unlikely to perform
the same task in the exact same way. Therefore, they use common typing features (such
as digraphs) that occur amongst users and base their decision on how uniquely each user
types the digraphs [27, 18, 33]. It is worth mentioning that the authors of [18] and [27]
acknowledge that not all digraphs are effective when discriminating users. From investi-
gation, [18] found the digraphs: in, io, no and on plus one other digraph that could
be ul, il or ly could be used to perfectly authenticate typists2. The findings made
by [27] regarding the importance of digraphs with relation to their discriminatory power
corroborates the findings of [18].
Unlike [27, 18, 33] where common/shared digraphs are used to discriminate between
users, we follow a different approach, one similar to that used in text retrieval regarding
frequently occurring features, i.e. discarding what is very common and using what is
unique to discriminate between users. Even though we agree with the findings of [27]
that common typing behaviour amongst users is typically associated with how most users
interact with keys associated unprintable characters, we hypothesise that the common
behaviour may not be limited to digraphs that contain unprintable characters only but
may also include other digraphs. Therefore, we present a OC-SVM based method to
remove digraphs that are common between users. This is done with the aim of improving
the discriminating ability of a classifier while reducing the amount of data that needs to
be processed.
5.2 One-Class Classification
One-Class Classification (OCC) is a classification approach where a learning agent is
trained to identify objects of one specific class, i.e. target class, by learning from a train-
ing set that only contains examples of the target class. The learning agent then learns
a decision boundary that encloses the data that belongs to the target class within the
boundary. When used for prediction on previously unseen data, the agent can make two
possible judgements- target if the observed data lies within the set decision boundary, or
unknown if the observed data lies outside of the boundary, this is illustrated in Figure 5.1.
OCC learning algorithms are mainly used for novelty detection, outlier detection and
anomaly detection. Therefore one-classification is also referred to as novelty detection or
outlier detection, depending on the context and application. One-class learning is usually
2In the experiment conducted by [18] six professional secretaries were used and the classifications
were made by hand.
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useful in situations where we have little or no negative examples but positive examples
are in abundance and we want to train a learning agent that would distinguish positive
examples from the negative ones. In the case of identity verification using KSD, one-class
classification is useful as we are only guaranteed of data from the legitimate user as it is
infeasible and impossible to collect typing samples of all possible impostors. Some of the
most used outlier/novelty detection algorithms in practice include one-class Gaussian,
one-class K-means, one-class kNN, and one-class SVM.
In the following section, we briefly look at the theory of a novelty detection algorithm,
the OC-SVM, which is a key component of the suggested approach used to detect and
eliminate common typing traits.
5.2.1 One-Class Support Vector Machines
OC-SVM are a specialised case of Support Vector Machines (SVM) by [50] intended for
unsupervised one-class learning. This algorithm employs a kernel function to perform a
transformation on the input data, therefore, mapping the data into a high-dimensional
feature space and finds the maximal margin hyperplane (decision boundary) that sepa-
rates the training data from the origin. To perform this separation, the authors suggest
solving a quadratic problem subject to some linear constraints3. Of the parameters in
the quadratics program, the one most valuable to our application is ν, ν ∈ (0, 1), which
is known as the contamination factor. This contamination factor is defined as the upper
bound on the fraction of training errors and a lower bound of the fraction of support
vectors. Simply put, the contamination factor corresponds to the probability of finding
a new, but regular, observation outside the learnt decision boundary.
When used for predictions on a newly observed data point, x, this algorithm outputs
a function, f , for each observed data point, i.e.,
f(x) =
+1, ifx lies within the decision boundary−1, ifx lies outside the decision boundary (5.1)
In the section to follow, we draw our attention to an important component of the OC-
SVM, the kernel function. We provide a brief review of some of the available kernel
options for the OC-SVM and discuss some of their strengths and weaknesses.
3To learn more about the quadratic program and its constraints, the interested reader may refer to
[50].
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5.2.1.1 Kernel Function
There are various kernel functions that can be employed to perform the transformation
task, some of them include those listed in Table 5.1 which are the commonly used kernels
for the OC-SVM. The decision boundary learnt by the OC-SVM is determined by the
kernel function used, examples of the decision boundaries associated with the kernels
in Table 5.1 are shown in Figure 5.1. The performance of the of the OC-SVM mainly
depends on how well the learnt decision boundary separates the target class from the
unknown class. Therefore, when selecting a kernel, one has to make a choice that will
result in the model making the least number of errors.
Each of the kernel functions listed in Table 5.1 has pros, cons and typical scenarios
in which it works best. The notable advantage of kernel functions: linear, polynomial
and sigmoid are is that computations are usually fast compared to those associated with
the Radial-Basis Function (RBF) kernel. These kernels work well in scenarios where the
data is linearly separable, i.e. where there exists a line that accurately separates the
target from the unknown class [51]. In our case, it is unknown whether the data we are
working with is linearly separable or not. Therefore, a kernel that places data points to
the left or the right of a linear separator may not be fit for the task.
Unlike the kernels discussed thus far, the RBF kernel creates a closed region around
the data that is most likely to belong to the target class and all points that lie outside
of that region are regarded as outlier. Due to its non-linear nature, this kernel works
in scenarios where the data is linearly separable and where it is not (which is usually
the case when with most datasets). Therefore, the performance of this kernel does not
hinge on separability of the data which is quite attractive. From Figure 5.1, one can
easily observe that the RBF out performs the other three kernels by a significant margin.
Furthermore, the authors of [51] report that when working with the OC-SVM one should
just use the RBF kernel and not bother trying other kernel functions as they are not fit
for solving OCC problems.
Table 5.1: Widely used kernel functions [51].
Kernel Name Kernel Expression
Linear κ(x1, x2) = 〈x1, x2〉
Polynomial κ(x1, x2) = (〈x1, x2〉+ 1)d, with d ∈ N∗
Sigmoid κ(x1, x2) = tanh(θ〈x1, x2〉), with θ ∈ R
RBF κ(x1, x2) = exp(−‖x1−x2‖
2
2σ2
), with σ ≥ 0
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Figure 5.1: Examples of One-Class Support Vector Machines boundaries for the different
kernel functions. Note: These examples were obtained on synthetic data as they are
meant for illustrative purposes.
5.3 Approach
Identifying common typing behaviour amongst users in a dataset can be achieved by
comparing the typing data of each and every user in the dataset while taking note of the
keystroke data that is similar between the users. Our hypothesis is that there exists some
shared typing behaviour between all or most users which can be identified by looking at
the speed it takes for users to type certain digraphs. We believe that majority of these
similar digraphs may include the aforementioned commonly typed digraphs, however,
they are not limited to them.
Consider the Venn diagram shown in Figure 5.2 where each circle represents a user’s
typing behaviour. The shared typing behaviour between users can be defined as the
intersection between the three circles in the Venn diagram. Therefore, given a typist
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dataset with data from N typists, the common typing patterns that occur amongst all
users, Usuper (henceforth referred to as the super user), occur in the region given by:




U ser  U 1
U ser  U 2
U ser  U 3
Figure 5.2: Venn diagram illustrating how user typing traits may overlap. Note: A circle
represents a single user’s typing behaviour/data.
The data points contained in the region described by 5.2 have little or no discriminating
power as they are common. Given only that data, it is not possible to determine who it
came from. Therefore, these common data points should be ignored during classification
or removed from the dataset entirely. The distinctive typing traits occur in regions where
a particular user’s circle does not intersect with another circle- these are the regions we
are interested in when classifying typists.
We exploit the characteristics of the OC-SVM with a RBF kernel to devise a method
of finding and eliminating common typing traits amongst users which is as follows:
1. Due to the number of keystrokes, it is infeasible to use all the keystrokes in the
dataset. Therefore, we randomly sample 500, 000 keystrokes from all the users in
the dataset to create the super user’s typing profile.
2. Perform feature extraction and pre-processing on the sampled keystrokes as de-
scribed in Chapter 4. An additional pre-processing step was employed to convert
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the keycodes from their number representation to categorical representation using
one-hot encoding. Since there are 99 unique keys, this encoding scheme converted
each keycode into a 1-dimensional array of zeros with a one at the index that cor-
responds with the integer label of the key as assigned by the encoder.
3. Instantiate the One-Class Support Vector Machines (OC-SVM)4 with the following
fixed hyper-parameter settings5:
 Kernel: RBF. Based on literature presented in Section 5.2.1.1, it was almost
obvious that the RBF kernel would out perform the other kernels for the OCC
task at hand. However, to ensure that the best kernel choice was made, a
grid search was performed to find parameter and hyper-parameter settings
best suited for our OCC task. As expected, the most satisfactory results
were obtained using the non-linear RBF kernel. Furthermore, the observations
we made from performing the grid search corroborate the findings made by
[51] that the RBF kernel typically gives the best results in OCC problems,
particularly when using the OC-SVM.
4. Fit the OC-SVM model using the super user’s typing data at varying ν values with
ν ∈ [0.2, 0.8].
5. After every fit operation, the model is then applied on the data of each user in the
dataset to determine the labels of each sample, +1 for inliers and −1 for outliers.
6. All the data samples that with a +1 were removed to create a new dataset that
corresponds with a particular value of ν. This process is repeated for ν ∈ [0.2, 0.8] in
increments of 0.1. The percentage of data removed is approximately (1−ν)×100%.
5.4 Experiment
To test and evaluate the proposed common data detection method, an experimental
procedure was designed and followed. The experimental data was sourced from the top
50 keystroke contributors6. The test procedure and evaluation criterion are thoroughly
detailed in the sections that follow.
4A public implementation of this algorithm by Sci-kit learn was used, see [52] and https:
//scikit-learn.org.
5All the other hyper-parameters were set to their default values.
6A subset of the users was used because as the number of users in the experiment increases, the
number of keystrokes samples to create the super user’s profile also has to be increased. The sample
size of the data used to create the super user is proportional to the time taken to train the OC-SVM,
therefore, its increase results in longer training times for the OC-SVM.
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5.4.1 Methodology
In order to observe the effects of the data removal, a one-class classifier, namely, Gaussian
Mixture Model (GMM)7 was implemented. The classifier model was trained and tested
using the reduced datasets obtained by varying ν. The GMM had the following hyper-
parameter settings:
 Number of mixture components: 90
 Covariance type: Full
 Initialisation method: K-Means method for initialising initial parameters such as
the weights, means and precisions.
These parameters were determined using a grid-search algorithm to optimise the hyper-
parameters. Default values were used for the other GMM parameters which are not
mentioned above.
To evaluate the suggested approach, an N × N square matrix, S, was constructed
by training a GMM model on single user’s data and test it using the data from the N
selected users. The rows of this matrix represented the actual user whose data was used
to train the model and the columns represented the classified users (i.e. users whose data
was used to test the model). The matrix was then populated using log-probability scores
returned by the GMM. This procedure was performed at varying data removal percentage
values.
To measure the effect the removal of common data has on the classifier’s discrimina-
tion ability, the discrimination index (δ) was used as a metric. The discrimination index
is a measure of how well a one-class classifier can discriminate between the normal and
anomalous data. To compute δ, we iterate through the columns (test sets) of S. In
each column we extract the log-probability score that lies on the main diagonal, Sj,j and
then determine the largest score in the column, max(Sj), excluding Sj,j . Using the Sj,j





∀j ∈ [1, N ] (5.3)
To obtain the overall δ for the system, the mean of all the per-column indexes was
computed. The discrimination index, δ, is always positive and larger values are better.
7A public implementation of this algorithm by Sci-kit learn was used, see [52] and https:
//scikit-learn.org.
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5.4.2 Results
The results of this experiment are shown in Table 5.2 and Figure 5.3. The results show
how the classifier discriminates between user as the datasets decreases in size due to the
removal of common data. At 90% data removal, it was observed that there was insuffi-
cient data to train the models thus a ν ∈ [0.2, 0.8] was used.
Looking at the results, it can be observed that the classifier’s performance improves
as common data is removed in the interval 0%− 40%. The improvement is shown the by
the increase in both δ and δmin, with the highest δ and δmin both recorded at 40% data
removal. This implies that around 40% of the data is common across all users and only
60% of the typing data is discriminating. The classifier’s performance drops beyond the
40% removal mark, in the range (40%, 70%]. This drop is most likely due to the loss of
data with sufficient information content due to high rates of data removal. In this range,
the classifier starts losing its discriminating ability. With regard to the increase in δ at
80%, the system starts behaving erratically, most likely as we are approaching the noise
floor of the classification algorithm.
Furthermore, by examining the removal of common data with respect to performance
of the classification algorithm, that is, the percentage of error. It can be observed that
as the error rate increases the discrimination index also increases. The possible reason
for this observation may be that the dataset used was small. Therefore, the overlap of
common data points between the users is not notable as the data points are most likely to
be far apart already thereby making the data removal to seem ineffective. The effects of
the common data removal may be properly observed where a substantially large dataset
is used as there would most likely be notable overlap of common data points from var-
ious users. In this case, the result would improve to show the effect of data removal on
the error rate. Even though δ and δmin are both maximised at 40% data removal (with
somewhat an acceptable classification performance), a removal rate of 0% is optimal.
The top ten digraphs labelled as common by the OC-SVM at different data removal
rates are presented in Table C1 of Appendix C. From observation, one can easily notice
that type of digraphs that are typically flagged as common are those that include un-
printable characters (characters that do not appear on the screen) such as Backspace,
Shift and Space, to mention but a few. A possible explanation for these digraphs that
include unprintable characters to be detected as common is that most users interact with
the keys associated with these characters in very similar ways irrespective of their typing
skill level. A similar observation was also made in [27].
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δ δmin % of Error
0.00 0 1.502 0.746 0.00
20.00 0 1.698 0.829 0.00
30.00 1 1.752 0.794 2.00
40.00 1 1.912 1.125 2.00
50.00 5 1.588 0.859 10.00
60.00 7 1.421 0.710 14.00
70.00 11 1.319 0.656 22.00
80.00 19 1.357 0.635 38.00
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Figure 5.3: Classifier performance using the discrimination index to investigate the effects
of removing common data.
In addition to digraphs that include unprintable characters there are digraphs that do not
consist of unprintable characters that were identified as common. The possible justifica-
tion for printable digraphs such as in and nt being classified as common is (application-
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specific) or (domain-specific) as these digraphs appear in the keywords of the program-
ming language used, those keywords include: int, main and include. Therefore due
to repeatedly typing the keywords associated with these digraphs it is most likely that
muscle memory comes to play thus resulting in almost everyone having similar timings
for those digraphs. Moreover, these digraphs appear in a lot of words in the English lan-
guage (which most participants use when typing), therefore, most users are accustomed
to typing them which results in them being type at fast speeds which are comparatively
similar for most users.
5.5 Remarks
While the proposed method is capable of detecting commonly occurring digraphs amongst
users in a typist dataset it has some shortcomings which include.
1. Fitting the models is a memory intensive task (and is time consuming as well) and
it gets worse as the value of ν increases. Scholkopfk et al. [50] report the correlation
between the value of ν and the time taken to fit a model, it was found that ν is
proportional to the memory used to store the model and the time taken to build
it. The findings from our experiments corroborate the observations made by the
authors of [50].
2. Applying the models at varying ν values to the dataset (in order to label the each
data point as outlying or inlying) is a time consuming task.
3. The accuracy of the removed common digraphs relies heavily on the sample data
used when creating the super user, therefore, information about other commonly
occurring digraphs may be missed. To address this limitation, the number of sam-
ples used to create the super user may be increased (ideally, one would use all
the keystroke data), however, it would be infeasible as it would require a lot of
computing resources and time which were not at our disposal.
5.6 Conclusion
This chapter proposed the use of a novelty detection algorithm, the OC-SVM to elim-
inate commonly occurring typing traits amongst users in a typist dataset to improve
classification accuracy. A brief theory of the components and concepts used to devise
the proposed approach was presented– one-class classification and the OC-SVM. For the
evaluation of the proposed algorithm, classification-based experiments were designed and
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conducted and the obtained results discussed. Lastly, the chapter concluded with brief
remarks– the strengths and shortcomings of the proposed approach.
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Application of Text Retrieval
Methods in Keystroke Dynamics
This chapter1 investigates whether text retrieval methods can be successfully employed
for the task of person verification by keystroke dynamics. The remainder of this chapter is
organised as follows. We start the chapter by exploring related works in both keystroke
dynamics and text retrieval. We then present a brief review of text retrieval theory
and its key concepts which include stop lists and term weighting, to mention but a few.
Thereafter, we describe our authentication algorithm which applies text retrieval methods
to achieve verification of online persons using a typing biometric.
6.1 Related Work
There exist two branches of KSD, namely, fixed-text and free-text keystroke analysis. In
fixed-text KSD, keystroke analysis is performed on pre-defined fixed-length text [5]. In
the case of free-text keystroke analysis, the user provides arbitrary text of variable length
[54, 39]. When applying fixed-text keystroke analysis only static authentication can be
achieved since analysis is limited to when a user enters their PIN/password which hap-
pens at the initiation of a computer session. On the contrary, using free-text keystroke
analysis allows continuous authentication by analysing keystrokes provided beyond the
login phase.
Most of the research done in KSD is in fixed-text analysis thus making the research in
free-text analysis quite limited [8]. However, recent studies show that significant progress
is being made in free-text analysis. The reason for this progress is that unlike fixed-text
analysis which only limited to the initiation of a computer session, continuous authenti-
1Part of the work presented in this chapter was published in [53].
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cation can be achieved beyond the login phase by employing free-text keystroke dynamics
[55].
In the sections to follow, existing studies and commercial products that employ both
fixed-text and free-text keystroke analysis will be reviewed. However, it should be noted
that the discussions relating to fixed-text keystroke analysis will be brief and more em-
phasis will be placed on free-text keystroke analysis as it is the most relevant to this
study.
6.1.1 Fixed-Text Keystroke Analysis
In KSD literature, fixed-text keystrokes analysis is usually employed to supplement
knowledge-based authentication schemes such as PIN or Password in order to make them
more robust; this case of fixed-text keystroke analysis is known as password hardening.
The idea here (in password hardening) is that users type in their login credentials; viz.
secret keys, usernames and names regularly thus making their typing signature in this
case very unique compared to when they are typing anything else. This unique typing
signature is typically accompanied by fast typing speeds. The reason for the fast typing
and unique signature is mainly attributed to muscle memory– the user’s muscles are used
to the finger movements involved when typing in their password (learnt through repeti-
tive typing of the password) therefore, resulting in very fast typing speeds even though
the user may not be a fast/skilled typist.
With a password hardening system in place, when a user’s password is compromised,
the keystroke analyser acts as a second layer of authentication. Consequently, this im-
plies that in addition to cracking the secret key, an impostor would also have to mimic
how the legitimate user types their password which may not be an easy task. Some of
the notable work done in password hardening are shown in Table 6.1. From the table,
it can be observed that the researchers have suggested various classifiers which employ
distance measures, classical statistical measures and machine learning algorithms.
Unlike password hardening, where verification is limited to the initiation of a computer
session, there exist a branch of fixed-text analysis where identity verification can be
achieved beyond the login phase. Here, the user is presented with a fixed-text prose to
copy-type during both the enrolment and verification phases. The length of the typing
samples are longer than those used in password hardening, usually an entire sentence
or longer. At the authentication phase, the typing sample provided during verification
is compared to the one collected at enrolment. Table 6.2 presents some of the notable
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studies performed in this branch of static keystroke authentication.
Table 6.1: Password hardening algorithms and their performance.
Study Sample Content Classifier IPR (%) FAR (%)
Joyce & Gupta
[56]
Username, password, names Statistical 0.25 16.36
Bleha et al. [57] Name and phrase Bayes 2.80 8.10
Revett et al. [58] Password Distance 5.60 5.60
Yu & Cho [59] Password OC-SVM 0.00 0.30
Rodrigues et al.
[60]
Numeric password HMM 3.60 3.60
Brown & Rogers
[61]
Name and surname Neural
Network
12.00 21.20
Ong & Lai [62] Password Clustering 15.00 15.00
According to our literature search, Gaines et al. [18] were perhaps the first to formally
introduce the idea of user identification by means of keystroke dynamics. Gaines’ exper-
iment consisted of six professional secretaries who were seasoned typists. Each secretary
was tasked to copy-type a prose of approximately 6,000 characters. This was done twice,
with the second sample collected 4 months later. The digraph times of the recorded
keystrokes were calculated and used as features. Through investigation, it was found
that 87 digraphs appeared more than ten times in all the typing samples. After perform-
ing significance statistics, it was discovered that only 5 of the 87 digraphs were necessary
to perfectly discriminate the typists (this implies an IPR and FAR of 0.00%). Those
digraphs are: in, io, no, on and the fifth digraphs could either be ul, il or ly. Even
though the keystrokes were logged on a computer, the classifications were performed by
hand and no automated classification algorithm was employed.
Umphress and Williams [63] collected two typing samples from 17 participants who were
tasked to copy-type prose. The first sample, was about 1,400 characters long and was
used as a reference sample. The second sample, viz. the test sample, consisted of approx-
imately 300 characters. The recorded keystrokes were then grouped into words and the
first six digraph times for each word were computed and stored in a matrix. A statistical
classifier was employed where a digraph time had to be within 0.5 standard deviations of
its mean for it to be considered valid. For the decision rule, a threshold-based approach
was followed. If the number of the valid digraph times a were greater or equal to the set
threshold, the sample is classified as belonging to the particular user undergoing verifi-
cation. The authors report an IPR of 6.00% and a FAR of 12.00%.
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Bergadano et al. [64] propose a custom measure for keystroke dynamics that uses the
tri-graph times as features. When comparing two samples, tri-graphs are extracted from
the samples and common tri-graphs between the two samples are stored in separate lists
ordered by their average durations (and alphabetical order is used as a tie-breaker). For
a sample to be classified as belonging to a particular user, the verification sample must
be closer to that of the user than that of any other user in the system. To evaluate their
approach, 154 volunteers were asked to type a prose of about 683 characters. Of the 154
experiment participants, 44 acted as legal users providing five samples and the remaining
110 acted as impostors and only provided a single sample. The authors report that their
algorithm achieved an IPR of 0.14% and a FAR of 0.00%.
Even though this method of authentication proved to be effective, it was not without
limitations. The main limitation being that when the user is being verified their activi-
ties are abruptly stopped so that they copy-type the prose in order to be verified. This
discontinuance negatively impacts the usability and user-friendliness of systems that em-
ploy such an authentication scheme as it disrupts the user’s activities. To address the
aforementioned limitation, researchers proposed a non-obtrusive identity verification ap-
proach which is presented in the immediate section to follow.
Table 6.2: Static authentication algorithms and their performance.
Study # Users Sample
Length
Classifier IPR (%) FAR (%)
Gaines et al. [18] 6 6000 Manual 0.00 0.00
Umphress &
Williams [63]
17 1400 + 300 Statistical 6.00 12.00
Bergadano et al.
[64]
154 683 Degree of
disorder
0.14 0.00
6.1.2 Free-Text Keystroke Analysis
This section presents some of the notable research done in continuous authentication re-
search using free-text keystroke analysis. The studies which are discussed are summarised
in Table 6.3.
Gunetti & Picardi (GP) [33] suggested a continuous verification approach based on the
static typist verification work by Bergadano et al. [64] discussed in the previous section.
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GP collected keystroke data from 205 participants over a period of 6 months. Of the 205
volunteers, 40 acted as genuine users and provided 15 typing samples whereas the 165
provided a single sample acted as impostors. The logging of the keystrokes was done via
a web application that ran on a browser, so the data was typed into an HTML form and
the keystroke timestamps were obtained using JavaScript. In this study n-graphs of la-
tency times were used as features, specifically digraphs, tri-graphs and four-graphs which
implies n = 2, 3, 4 respectively. The implemented authentication algorithm achieved IPR
of 0.03% and a FAR of 3.17%. Even though the typing samples in this this study were
written in Italian, GP’s algorithm was also tested on English text samples and it was
reported that there were insignificant changes in the algorithm’s performance [54, 65].
Table 6.3: Free-text keystroke dynamics authentication algorithms and their performance.
Study # Users Classifier IPR (%) FAR (%)
Dowland &
Furnell [66]
63 Statistical 4.90 0.00
Gunetti &
Picardi [33]
205 Nearest Neighbour 0.03 3.17
Messerman et
al. [67]
55 Nearest Neighbour 2.02 1.84
Stewart et al.
[34]
30 k-Nearest Neighbour - -
Ahmed &
Traore [35]
53 Neural Networks 0.015 4.82
Dowland and Furnell [66] gathered approximately 3.5 million keystrokes from 35 partici-
pants. Their data collection was carried out for a period of 3 months. They implemented
an unrestricted data logger, this is, a data logger that records all keyboard activities
across all applications on a computer. They implement a statistical classifier using di-
graph times as features; this classifier was taken from their previous study [68]. A digraph
time is accepted if it is within a certain factor of its mean. When evaluated, their al-
gorithm achieved an IPR of 4.90% and a FAR 0.00%. The authors reported that when
the five worst users (viz. users with inconsistent typing patterns) were removed, the IPR
reduced to 1.7%.
The work of Messerman et al. was based on the works by [64] and [33] with the aim of
addressing some of the shortcomings of [33] such as the high FAR and the long decision-
making time due to comparing a new sample with all user samples stored in the database.
A web-mail application was implemented for the purpose of data collection and a dataset
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of about 3 million keystrokes with 55 users was compiled over a period of 12 months. The
results reported by the authors show that the decision-making time of the algorithm was
reduced substantially2 and the FAR was reduced, however, the IPR they achieved was
more than the one achieved in [33].
Stewart et al. [34] investigated the use of keystrokes and stylometry traits for authen-
ticating online test takers. The stylometry part of the system focused on the linguistic
features in the student’s text i.e. what the student typed. The dataset in this study was
made using typing data from 30 university students taking an online exam. This system
was built to improve the performance of an existing system. The verification system uses
digraph times as a feature and a k-nearest neighbour based classifier. The system was
tested in an open and closed-setting and achieved EERs of 1.4% and 0.55% respectively.
This change in the EER shows how performance in a closed system is better compared
to that of an open system. The authors reported that the KSD component performed
better than the stylometry module. This study has the same aim as the study of this
dissertation which is to employ KSD as method of verification in order to ensure academic
integrity.
Ahmed & Traore [35] suggest an approach for continuous authentication using KSD
that combines monograph and digraph analysis and employs a neural network to predict
missing digraphs based on the relation between the observed keystrokes. In this study
the keystroke logger was unrestricted. The hold-time and a digraph of latency times were
used as features for building the typist profile. The authors claim that their approach
achieves an accuracy level comparable to the state-of-the-art authentication algorithm
at a very low processing time. This system was experimentally evaluated in both an
open and closed environment using a dataset with 53 subjects. It was reported that the
implemented algorithm achieved an IPR of 0.015% and a FAR of 4.82%.
The major challenges in free-text keystroke analysis include the lack of publicly available
datasets and the lack of benchmarking studies to test the performance of authentication
algorithms across all available datasets [55]. The aforementioned challenges can be at-
tributed to the common practice in KSD research that each researcher or research group
that publishes a study creates their own dataset and measures parameters that suit their
application3. Thus, finding the state-of-the-art is a challenge due to the variations in data
2In GP’s study, the reported decision-making time for their authentication algorithm is about 140 s.
The authors of [33] report that they were able to reduce this time to 0.5 s.
3An example of this is GP’s study were only keydown events and key codes were recorded. Not
recording keyup events limits the usage of GP’s dataset.
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collection, and experimental and test procedure. However, most studies [69, 70, 71, 72]
have replicated the study by Gunetti and Picardi [33] and used their dataset which makes
their authentication algorithm one of the state-of-the-art in KSD authentication research.
The work presented in this chapter is inspired by some of the notable work done in
computer vision as a result of the application of text retrieval methods to achieve object
recognition in video content [73] and image searching [74]. Sivic and Zisserman [73] pro-
pose a text retrieval based approach to retrieve frames and snippets of a video containing
a user specified object (user presents an image of the object). They obtain their training
data by sampling several shots which represent about 10% of the frames in the movie.
They extract local descriptors from the training frames and quantise the descriptor vec-
tors using K-means clustering. They create the notion of a “visual” word which is defined
as the cluster number, k, of the cluster nearest to the descriptor vector. In this view,
an image can be seen as a text document made up of visual words. The visual words
within the document are weighted according to the Term Frequency-Inverse Document
Frequency (TF-IDF) score. Retrieval is then performed by calculating the cosine simi-
larity between the query and source “documents”.
Nister et al. [74] continue from the work of [73], however, unlike in [73] where a flat
vocabulary is used they use a hierarchically defined vocabulary that forms a vocabulary
tree. The vocabulary tree is constructed by hierarchically quantising descriptor vectors
using hierarchical K-means clustering. In the case of the hierarchical version of the K-
means, k defines the number of children of each node and not the final number of clusters.
Instead of using the normal TF-IDF weighting scheme, they suggest hierarchical TF-IDF
weighting for the hierarchically defined visual words in the vocabulary tree. The authors
report that their approach allows for a more efficient lookup of visual words, the use of a
larger vocabulary and improves quality of retrieval.
What is attractive with the employment of text retrieval methods in the aforementioned
works is that it produced fast yet accurate results. This is because the matches are pre-
computed. The authors in both [73] and [74] reported that they were able to query results
on par as Google’s text search in terms of the accuracy and speed. The authors in [74]
state that the main drawback with the text retrieval approach is that it requires some
pre-computations (building of the vocabulary of visual words) to be performed and the
process is time consuming. This is why they ([74]) opted for the hierarchical version of
the K-means instead of the flat version. Notwithstanding the aforementioned limitation,
the fast querying and high accuracy makes it worthwhile to pursue this avenue.
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6.1.3 Applications
Finding literature on real world applications that employ keystroke dynamics to enhance
security was quite a challenge. However, there exist a few commercial products which are
offered via the Internet as a software service. The challenge is that entities that own these
applications do not release any information regarding implementation and performance
of their systems in order to protect their trade secrets. BioPassword Inc. is a Software
as a Service (SaaS) based company that owns the patent for the keystroke technology
and provides software-based biometric security solutions [17]. Two other companies that
provide keystroke dynamics based security enhancement solutions are TypingDNA [75]
and Deepnet Security [76] with their solution named TypeSense.
6.2 Text Retrieval
Given a collection of documents, the task of text retrieval can be defined as the use of a
user specified query to identify a subset of documents that satisfy the user’s information
need. In this section, we present the basic theory relating to text retrieval. We start this
section by introducing the core terminology used in text retrieval literature which are
paramount to our work [49].
 Term4 - a sequence of characters that can be treated as a single logical entity. Terms
are usually words, however, there exists terms that are not thought of as words,
such as “MI6” or “K-9”.
 Bag-of-Words - a model for extracting text features by ignoring the exact ordering
of terms in a document but focusing on the number of occurrences of terms in the
documents.
 Document - a unit of textual information.
 Query - a request for information.
 Corpus - a collection of all the documents on which text retrieval is performed.
 Vocabulary - a collection of all unique terms found in the corpus.
Text retrieval systems typically employ a standard procedure [49]. We briefly describe
this process in the context of text retrieval using the English language. First, the text
4“Term” and “word” are used interchangeably by most authors, however, we shall use term for the
sake of consistency, avoiding ambiguity and to minimize confusion.
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in the documents is tokenised, converting the each document into a list of terms. Lin-
guistic pre-processing5 such as stemming is then applied to terms. Stemming represents
each word with its stem, for example the words: “type”, “typing” and “typed” would be
represented by the stem “type”. Thereafter, a stop list is then built and used to remove
words that appear in most documents (these words are referred to as stop words) as
such words are not discriminating for any particular document. Example stop words in
English include “a”, “is” and “the”, to mention but a few.
The words that remain after the stop words removal are then assigned unique integer
based identifiers and each document is represented by its vector equivalent known as a
document vector. A document vector is a representation of a document as a vector with
one component corresponding to each term in the vocabulary, together with a weight
for each component [49]. There are various ways of weighting terms, we discuss them in
Section 6.2.2. Finally, the set of document vectors representing all the documents in the
corpus are organised as an inverted index/file. An inverted index is book-index like data
structure with each term in the vocabulary together with a list of all the documents (and
position in that document) in which the term appears [73]. The purpose of an inverted
index is to allow fast full-text searches, at the cost of increased processing when a docu-
ment is added to the database. What makes an inverted file the preferred approach over
other possible data structures is its efficiency with respect to storage space and retrieval
time. All the aforementioned processes are performed to construct the inverted index
and they take place before the actual retrieval.
For the actual retrieval to take place, a user makes a query which details the infor-
mation they wish to retrieve from the system. The user’s query goes through the same
pre-processing as described above in order to get its vector representation. Thereafter,
the similarity (computed by measuring the angle between two vectors) between the query
vector and each of the document vectors of the documents in the corpus is the computed,
this is discussed in detail in Section 6.2.3. The search result is a list of documents ranked
by similarity score, in descending order. A document is considered to be relevant if
the user deems the information contained within it to be of value with respect to their
information need.
5The linguistic pre-processing is not limited to stemming only, there are other pre-processing task
that are applied.
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6.2.1 Stop List
In Chapter 5, we suggested a method for detecting and removing common features that
occur amongst most users in our typist dataset. This was done with the aim of improving
the classifier’s discrimination ability as these commonly occurring features provide little
or no discrimination therefore making them useless. As mentioned before, in text re-
trieval there already exists a way of handling poor discriminators (the most and/or least
occurring terms) in the corpus. This is achieved by the use of a stop list.
The typical way of determining a stop list is by calculating the total number of times each
term, t, appears in the corpus. This is known as the collection frequency and is denoted
by cft. After computing cft for each term, the terms are sorted based on their cf in
descending order. The top u terms (most common terms) and/or the bottom m terms
(least common terms) are then filtered out so that they are not included during indexing;
u,m ∈ N. The terms that exhibit reasonable discriminative power are those which are
neither common nor rare. Later, in Section 6.2.2 we will see how term weighting results
in the most/least frequent terms having little impact on document ranking.
Even though an ideal stop list is made of both the most and least occurring terms,
most studies in literature make use of a stop list for dropping common terms which
shows that generally emphasis is put on the removal of the commonly used terms. The
use of a stop list results in smaller inverted lists as there are less terms to be indexed
therefore reducing the amount of disk space needed to store the inverted file. Having a
smaller inverted file allows for even faster retrieval times. Moreover, the removal of poor
discriminators improves the retrieval accuracy of a text retrieval system.
6.2.2 Term Weighting
In the section immediately above, it was established that not all terms are equally im-
portant. In this section, we explore ways that can be employed to further assess the
importance of each term in a document especially when considering relevance between a
user query and a document during retrieval. This evaluation of term importance can be
achieved through term weighting, which is the assignment of numerical values (weights)
to terms in order to represent their importance in a document, based on the statistics
of the occurrence of the term [49, 77]. By applying term weighting, the focus is put on
the occurrences of a term in a document and the semantics of the language used in the
document, that is, the exact ordering of terms is ignored completely. The approach of
extracting textual features is known as the Bag-of-Words (BoW) model. When using
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this model, documents “Bokang types faster than Dintle” and “Dintle types faster than
Bokang” are identical as they would have the same BoW model.
The simplest way of assigning a weight to a term would be to let the weight to be
equal to the number of occurrences of term, t, in document, d. This weighting scheme is
known as term frequency and is denoted by tft,d. Usually tft,d is normalised by dividing
it by the total number of terms in d. The usage of tf as a weighting function presents one
main limitation: all terms are considered equally significant when evaluating relevancy
on a query. As a matter of fact certain terms have little or no discriminating power in
determining relevance. For example, given a collection of documents on a subject such as
medicine it is likely that the term “diagnosis” will appear in almost in every document
thus making the term less discriminative. The tf weighting scheme does not take into
account the discriminating power of the term.
To address the aforementioned limitation that the tf weighting scheme suffers from,
the effect of terms that appear too often in a document such that they are insignificant
when determining relevancy is suppressed by multiplying the term frequency with what





where N is the number of documents in the corpus and dft is the document frequency of
term t. The document frequency is defined as the number of documents in which term
t appears. The idf is a weight indicating how widely a word is used across the corpus.
Therefore, the idf of a rare term is high, whereas the idf of a frequent term is likely to
be low. Combining the definitions of term frequency and inverse document frequency
brings about the widely used term weighting scheme in text retrieval literature known as
term frequency-inverse document frequency, denoted by tf -idft,d. Using this scheme, the
weight assigned to term t in document d is given by:
tf -idft,d = tft,d × idft (6.2)
Put differently, tf -idft,d assigns a weight to term t in document d that is [49]:
 highest when t occurs many times within a small number of documents, therefore,
lending high discriminating power to those documents;
 lower when t occurs fewer times in a document, or occurs in many documents,
therefore, offering a less pronounced relevance signal;
 lowest when t occurs in almost all documents.
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6.2.3 Scoring and Ranking
In the final stage of the text retrieval process, documents that contain information that
is similar to the query are identified. The similarity is determined by computing the
distance between a (query, document) pair for each document in the corpus. The value
returned by the distance function, known as the similarity score, is used to rank the
search results (list of documents), with the most similar documents appearing at the top.
In this section, we look at the mechanics involved when scoring and ranking documents
to identify a group of documents that fulfill the user’s information need.
In text retrieval, a document is represented by a vector with each component corre-
sponding to each term t in the vocabulary, together with its weight wti computed using
some weighting function [77]. Assuming a vocabulary of L terms, each document d is
represented by a document vector of length l given by
~V (d) = [t0, wt0 ; t1, wt1 ; t2, wt2 ; ...; tL, wtL ]
ᵀ (6.3)
Vocabulary terms that do not appear in document d are assigned a term weight wti of
zero. The standard weighting function used in text retrieval is the TF-IDF, therefore,
wti is usually computed using (6.2). By converting each document in the corpus to its
vector form, we end up with set of documents as vectors in a common vector space, in
which each term has its own axis. This is known as the vector space model.
There a number of distance functions that can be employed for determining similar-
ity measure, we only discuss the cosine similarity as it is considered the standard in
literature. We denote the similarity between two documents, d1 and d2 as sim(d1, d2).
The cosine similarity between two documents is given by
sim(d1, d2) =
~V (d1) · ~V (d2)
|~V (d1)||~V (d2)|
; (6.4)
where the numerator represents the dot product between the document vectors and the
denominator is the product of their Euclidean lengths. The presence of the Euclidean
lengths in the denominator length-normalises the document vectors ~V (d1) and ~V (d2) to
unit vectors ~v(d1) = ~V (d1)/|~V (d1)| and ~v(d2) = ~V (d2)/|~V (d2)|. Therefore, we can rewrite
6.4 as
sim(d1, d2) = ~v(d1) · ~v(d2). (6.5)
The similarity measure sim(d1, d2) is the cosine of the angle θ between two document
vectors. The value of θ is defined in the range [0, π]; therefore, 0 ≤ sim(d1, d2) ≤ 1, with
a score of 1 being the best and 0 is the worst. An illustration of the cosine similarity
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measure is shown in Figure 6.1.
A user defined query q can be treated as a very short document. Therefore, a vec-
tor, ~V (q) can be derived from a user defined query, q; with ~V (q) being in the same vector
space as the document collection. The similarity score between the query vector and
each document vector in the corpus is then computed as described above and the results
ranked by similarity score.
t 1
t 2
Figure 6.1: Illustration of the cosine similarity measure between two documents;
sim(d2, d3) = cos θ.
6.3 Approach
In this section, we present our keystroke authentication algorithm that is based on text
retrieval methods. We start by describing how the notion of a term is created in order
to enable us to build word-like text features using keystroke features. Lastly, we describe
the authentication algorithm used to verify users.
6.3.1 Building the Vocabulary
In order to apply text retrieval methods, we build a vocabulary of terms using keystroke
features similar to how [73] and [74] create the notion of visual words. The aim here is to
quantise the timing information associated with a digraph sequence (fki,tkj) into several
clusters. We then use the (fki,tkj) pair and the cluster number to create a term in the
form “fki tkj k”; where k is the cluster nearest to the timing information of digraph
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(fki,tkj). The quantising of the timing information is achieved by employing K-means
clustering. The process of building a vocabulary of terms is as follows.
1. Select all keystroke data associated with digraph sequences that have at least hun-
dred occurrences.
2. Perform feature extraction and pre-processing on the sampled keystrokes as de-
scribed in Chapter 4.
3. For each unique digraph sequence, apply K-means6 clustering on the PCA generated
timing features associated with the sequence to obtain cluster centroids associated
with timings for each digraph sequence. The K-means clustering algorithm was
initialised as follows:
 Initialisation method: k-means++. Selects initial cluster centers in a way that
ensures fast convergence.
 Number of clusters (k): 8. The number of clusters to form as well as the
number of centroids to generate. Therefore, k ∈ [1, 8].
 Number of jobs: −1. Used to specify how many concurrent processes should be
used for parallelised routines. If set to −1, all CPUs are used to concurrently
run computations.
4. Create a lookup table of all the digraph sequences and their K-means cluster cen-
troids.
5. To create terms, iterate through each user’s keystroke data and for each keystroke
extract the digraph sequence and look it up in the lookup table.
 If the digraph sequence is present in the lookup table, compute the Euclidean
distance between the user’s times for the digraph and the sequence’s centroids.
Return the cluster number, k, of the closest centroid.
 If digraph sequence is not present in the lookup table, it is ignored.
By building a vocabulary of terms, we have converted keystroke dynamics features into
“textual” features or words, therefore redefining authentication by keystrokes dynamics as
a text retrieval problem. We can now create a clear analogy between keystrokes dynamics
and text retrieval as follows:
 keystroke features are terms,
6A public implementation of this algorithm by Sci-kit learn was used, see [52] and https:
//scikit-learn.org.
63
Chapter 6 Application of Text Retrieval Methods in Keystroke Dynamics
 a user is equivalent to a document,
 a typing sample provided during authentication is a query.
6.3.2 Authentication
The final and maybe the most important stage in the authentication process is where
the system makes a decision to accept or reject the identity claim made by the user by
means of some predefined decision rule. This rule plays a vital role for determining the
overall robustness of the system. If the rule is too lenient, easy access is given to everyone
including impostors (resulting in a high IPR) and if the rule is too strict, it may be very
robust against impostors but wrongfully reject legitimate users too often (resulting in
a high FAR). Therefore, this rule has to be devised to ensure an acceptable trade-off
between the IPR and FAR. In this section, the process of authenticating a subject using
the suggested authentication algorithm is described.
Assume a new typing sample qX (that is claimed to belong to user U– a known user) is
presented to an authentication system. The system must determine the validity of the
claim. It is possible that qX may belong to U or another known user or someone who is
unknown to the system. To determine the validity of the claim, the following process is
followed:
1. Compute the cosine similarity between query qX and the reference document of U ;
viz. sU = sim(qX , dU).
2. Compute the cosine similarity sim(qX , dn) between qX and all the documents in the
collection, i.e. d1 through dn; where n is the number of users in the system.
3. Compute the average of the similarity scores (sU is excluded when computing the






sim(qX , di) i 6= U (6.6)
4. The system then accepts or rejects the identity claim using the following rule:
h(sU) =
accept, if sU/savg > Treject, if sU/savg < T ; (6.7)
where h(sU) is the decision function and T is a fixed preset threshold. The threshold
T is determined experimentally and may vary from one dataset to another. Its
formulation is discussed in Section 7.2.1.
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6.4 Conclusion
This chapter investigated the application of text retrieval methods and concepts for user
verification by keystroke dynamics. The related works in both text retrieval and keystroke
dynamics were explored. A brief discussion of text retrieval concepts that are important
to the proposed algorithm was also given. To end the chapter, the proposed keystroke




A system that performs keystroke analysis can be evaluated on three tasks when a new
sample X is presented to the system:
 Classification: X is from a one of the known users. The system must determine
who actually provided the sample.
 Authentication: X is claimed to belong to user U (a known user). The system
must determine the validity of the claim. It is possible that X may belong to U or
another known user or someone who is unknown to the system.
 Identification: X is presented to the system. The system has two possible re-
sponses: (a) X belongs to user U ; (b) X belongs to someone unknown.
In this chapter, we conduct experiments to evaluate the performance of the suggested
text retrieval based keystroke analysis algorithm on two of the aforementioned tasks,
namely, classification and authentication. Furthermore, with the aid of experiments,
the behaviour of the suggested algorithm will be studied with respect to the removal of
common data and the query length. This done for both classification and authentication
tasks. This will help determine the optimal parameter settings that can be used to achieve
accurate results. Lastly, the approach suggested in this study is compared with one of
the state-of-the-art KSD authentication algorithms.
7.1 User Classification
To conduct the experiments detailed in this section, documents with at least 2000 terms
are selected. Thereafter, each document is divided into two sets, the first set is used
as the reference document and it remains in the corpus. The second document which
consists of 1000 terms is used a query. For each query drawn from each of the n users, the
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cosine similarity sim(q, dn) is computed between q and all the documents in the corpus,
viz. d1 through dn; where n is the number of users selected for the experiment. Ideally,
the classification algorithm should assign the highest similarity score to the (q, dn) pair
that were drawn from the same user and lower scores for the rest of the pairs. If this is
the case, it is recorded as correct classification and if the opposite is true then a missed
classification is recorded.
In addition to using our datasets, the algorithm is evaluated on two more datasets,
namely, Villani’s [78, 79] and Stewart’s [34, 80]. Villani’s dataset was collected from a di-
verse pool of subjects which include university, students, faculty staff, friends and family
resulting in 144 participants in total. The participants were given typing tasks for both
free-text and fixed-text input. For the free-text collection, participants were instructed
to respond to open-ended essay questions and for fixed-text collection they were required
to copy type fables. Furthermore, the users were required to perform the same typing
tasks on a desktop keyboard and on a laptop PC keyboard. We treat the data as separate
datasets as it was collected under different environmental conditions. Stewart’s dataset
was gathered from 43 students taking a spreadsheet modelling course. The keystroke data
was logged on free-text input in an examination room (a computer laboratory equipped
with the same desktop computers) while the user was attempting assessment questions.
A numerical summary of the data collected by Villani1 and Stewart is given in Table 7.1.
To quantify the performance of the system, we report the number of missed classifications
and the system’s percentage of error.
Table 7.1: Data collection summary of third party datasets.
Dataset Users No. Keystrokes Avg. Keystrokes/User
Villani (Desktop) 105 360,000 3,400
Villani (Laptop) 87 300,000 3,400
Stewart 43 780,000 18,000
7.1.1 Results
The results of the user classification experiment are reported in Table 7.2. Looking at
the table, it can be observed that the algorithm performed well on most datasets, how-
1Villani’s dataset consists of data collected on both fixed and free-text input, we only report numbers
related to the collection of keystrokes on free-text input.
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ever, the worst performance overall was obtained on Stewart’s dataset where six missed
classifications were recorded.
Table 7.2: Classification performance of our algorithm on multiple datasets. The number
of classifications made is 43, which is the number of users selected in each of the datasets.
Dataset Missed Classifications % of Error
Stewart 6 13.95
Villani (Laptop) 2 4.47
Ours (Assessment) 1 2.33
Villani (Desktop) 0 0.00
Ours (Practice) 0 0.00
In order to determine the possible reasons that may have resulted in the poor performance
of the algorithm on Stewart’s dataset, a further analysis was performed. This was done
by plotting the colourmap shown in Figure 7.1 which shows the cosine similarity score
between every (q, dn) pair by colour intensity (dark shade of gray for high sim scores and
lighter shades for low sim scores) and the missed classifications which are marked by a
red circle around the cell. The cells that lie on the main diagonal represent the sim scores
obtained on (q, dn) pairs that belong to the same user. Ideally, the similarity scores on
the main diagonal should be the highest in their corresponding columns thereby resulting
in the cells on the main having a deep shade of gray and all the other surrounding cells
having lighter shades of gray.
By paying attention to the shades of cells that were incorrectly classified and comparing
them to the shade of the cell on the main diagonal in the respective column, it can be ob-
served that the shading of the cells is very similar. This means that the similarity scores
in this case are quite close which implies that the two users (the actual users and the
incorrectly classified user) may exhibit similar typing behaviour. Based on the observa-
tions made, we anticipate that the missed classifications that were observed when testing
on Stewart’s dataset are most likely to have occurred on users that have indiscriminate
typing traits (as shown by the very light shading of the cells on the main diagonal) which
leads to poor self-matching when classifying samples.
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Figure 7.1: Colourmap of cosine similarities scores between the actual users and the
classified users for Stewart’s dataset. Each cell represents a similarity score between a
(q, dn) pair. Cells that lie on the main diagonal represent the scores obtained on (q, dn)
pairs that belong to the same user and the red circles around the cells represent missed
classifications, i.e. a (q, dn) pair that scored more than that of the actual user.
7.1.2 Environmental Effects on Typing Behaviour
Considering that in this study the users’ typing behaviour was monitored in two differ-
ent environments, i.e. the assessment site and the practice site, we investigate whether
a user’s typing behaviour is consistent regardless of the change in environments. To
achieve this, typing samples collected on the same site are compared against each other
(the document collection/corpus and the query are from the same site). We also compare
samples collected on the different sites against each other by using a corpus from one site
and draw the query from a different site (e.g. corpus from the practice site and a query
from the assessment site).
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The authors of [78] conduct a similar investigation where their algorithm was trained
and tested on data collected using the same keyboard (e.g. train and test on data col-
lected using a laptop keyboard). The algorithm was also trained using data gathered
using desktop keyboards and tested with data collected on laptop keyboards and vice
versa. Therefore, we run this experiment on their datasets using our algorithm. In this
experiment we only select users that have provided samples in both environments.
7.1.2.1 Results
The results obtained in this experiment where user typing samples collected in two dif-
ferent environments were compared to determine whether typing behaviour varies with
a change in environmental conditions are shown in Table 7.3. It can be observed that
when comparing samples obtained in the same environment the algorithm performs well
in classifying users. This is the case for our datasets and those of Villani. When com-
paring samples from the same environments, the worst performance resulted in an error
of 4.65% due to a misclassification of two users. When comparing samples from different
environments, the performance dropped drastically especially on the Villani datasets. In
this case, the classifier failed dismally at classifying users which is most likely due to the
susceptibility of the users typing signature to the environment. This susceptibility in the
case of our datasets may be due to some of the following factors:
 The change in hardware, the hardware used in assessments is the same for everyone.
However, in the practice site a student could use multiple devices which include
desktops, laptops, tablet PCs and mobile phones.
 On the practice site students can help each other which introduces typing behaviour
of other individuals (known or unknown) thereby contaminating the typing profile.
 Students are usually relaxed when doing tasks on the practice site, however, during
assessments they are likely to stress due to pressure which may cause their typing
signature to change.
A similar trend can be observed when looking at Table 7.4, where the authors of [78]
performed a similar experiment using their algorithm on Villani’s datasets. From their
results, it can be easily noticed that their algorithm performed better than our algorithm
on both Villani’s datasets. Though the differences are not significant for the same en-




Table 7.3: Classification performance of our algorithm in varying environmental condi-
tions. We test our algorithm on Villani’s Desktop and Laptop datasets. The number of
classifications made is 43, which is the number of users selected in each of the datasets.
A. OUR DATASETS
Corpus Query Missed Classifications % of Error
Practice Practice 0 0.00
Assessment Assessment 0 0.00
Assessment Practice 18 41.86
Practice Assessment 23 53.49
B. VILLANI’S DATASETS
Corpus Query Missed Classifications % of Error
Desktop Desktop 1 2.33
Laptop Laptop 2 4.65
Desktop Laptop 28 65.12
Laptop Desktop 34 79.07
In [78], the authors also investigate the consistency of a users typing behaviour by vary-
ing two independent variables- keyboard type (desktop keyboard and laptop keyboard)
and input type (free-text and fixed-text). The users typing samples collected in differ-
ent environments are then compared to see to test for consistency. The authors report
high accuracies in cases where the training and test data we gathered under the same
environmental conditions. On the contrary, when comparing samples collected in dif-
ferent environments the performance drop drastically; part of the results they reported
are shown in Table 7.4. We only show the results related to experiments performed on
free-text input as we also focus on free-text in our study.
The findings of [78] corroborate our findings regarding a users typing behaviour un-
der varying environmental conditions. Based on the results, we are of the view that
keystroke data used to train and test should be collected in a setting where there are
minimal changes especially in terms of the hardware used, type of input and environmen-
tal conditions. Furthermore, we reckon that these inconsistencies in typing behaviour are
most likely to worsen if the user is not a skilled typist, as in the case of our subjects.
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Table 7.4: Classification performance of Tappert’s algorithm in varying environmental




% of Error Subjects % of Error
Desktop Desktop 1.70 93 6.70




% of Error Subjects % of Error
Desktop Laptop 41 40 40.90
Laptop Desktop 39 40 37.60
7.1.3 Removal of Common Data
In Chapter 5, we presented a OC-SVM based method for detecting and removing common
typing patterns which can be applied at the data pre-processing step. It was shown
experimentally that this pre-processing step improved the discrimination ability of a
classifier thus making it a necessity. We perform a similar experiment here by exploiting
the concept of a stop list which is found text retrieval literature. In this experiment,
we investigate the effect of the most common/rare terms (stop words) on the classifiers
discrimination ability. To achieve this, the size of the stop list is varied by increasing
or decreasing parameters dfmin (for rare terms) and dfmax (for common terms) to reject
terms that appear and/or do not appear in a certain percentage of the documents in the
corpus.
Figure 7.2 shows the relationship between a term’s usage in the corpus and its importance
to the document in which it appears. In the figure, it can be seen that terms that occur
very frequently (with a dft > dfmax) or very rarely (with a dft < dfmin) in the corpus have
relatively low importance compared to terms that with a df that lies between dfmax and
dfmin (these are the terms we would like to keep). Therefore, when indexing vocabulary
terms, terms that have a document frequency df strictly higher than the given threshold
which we denote as dfmax are ignored. For example, if dfmax = 0.1 all terms that appear
in more than 10% of the documents are ignored meaning that only terms that appear in
10% of the documents or less remain. In this experiment, we only focus on the removal
of common terms and not that of rare terms, therefore, we only vary dfmax while dfmin is
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Figure 7.2: Plot shows the relationship between a term’s importance (to a document it
occurs in) and its statistics of occurrence in the corpus. A rare term has a dft < dfmin , a
frequently used term has a dft > dfmax and a term that is regarded as a good discriminator
has a dfmin < dft < dfmax.
always kept constant. The dfmax was varied in the range [0.1, 1] with increments of 0.1
and a constant query length of 1000 terms was used.
In addition to missed classifications and percentage of error, we report the mean dis-
crimination index (δ), minimum discrimination index (δmin) and the percentage of the
actual data removed due to the elimination of common terms. The discrimination index
is computed as described in Section 5.4.
7.1.3.1 Results
The results obtained by performing the common data removal by means of a stop list are
shown in Table 7.3. To improve the quality of results, dfmax was incremented in steps of
0.025 in the range [0.1, 0.2]. This was done to improve the resolution in this range as the
percentage of error associated with the classifier changes substantially between 0.1 and
0.2.
Observing the results presented in Table 7.5 and Figure 7.3, it can be seen that the ef-
fect of the removal of common terms on the classifiers performance is most visible when
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0.1 34 1.756 0.000 56.81 12.01
0.125 19 1.851 0.246 49.95 6.71
0.15 9 1.892 0.480 44.55 3.18
0.175 4 1.913715 0.753 40.38 1.41
0.2 2 1.913849 0.854 36.68 0.71
0.3 1 1.836 0.934 25.85 0.35
0.4 0 1.775 1.041 18.40 0.00
0.5 0 1.699 1.076 13.53 0.00
0.6 0 1.634 1.098 9.95 0.00
0.7 0 1.573 1.160 7.16 0.00
0.8 0 1.511 1.181 4.25 0.00
0.9 0 1.449 1.179 2.01 0.00
1.0 0 1.373 1.115 0.00 0.00
dfmax is between 0.1 and 0.2, reason being that within this interval a substantial number
of terms are removed. The terms that remain in this case are most likely rare terms
that are unique to very few documents thus resulting in most documents being classified
incorrectly. The overall trend between the size of the stop list and the classifier’s perfor-
mance suggests that the percentage of error associated with the classifier improves with
a decrease in the size of the stop list.
The most important relationship in this experiment is that between dfmax and the dis-
crimination indices, i.e. δ and δmin. These indices provide insight on how the classifier’s
discrimination ability changes with the removal of terms. By observing the δ and δmin
with relation to dfmax, one can easily see that the discrimination indices increase until
they peak at particular dfmax values and then decrease thereafter. The δ is maximised at
approximately dfmax = 0.2 where terms that appear in more than 20% of the documents
are removed thus resulting in an overall data removal of approximately 37%. This means
that at dfmax = 0.2 the classifier discriminates majority of the users well. This good dis-
crimination ability may be attributed to the presence of mostly unique data in the user
documents as most common data is removed at this dfmax value. For any dfmax > 0.2, the
δ decreases. The possible reason for this observation might be that as dfmax increases,
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the amount of common data removed reduces thereby leading to documents consisting
with substantially common terms which then decreases δ.
Even though δ gives us an indication of how well all the users are being discriminated,
the δmin give us insight on how well the worst user is performing (in terms of the dis-
crimination index). Therefore, the optimal dfmax is found where the δmin is maximised.
The maximisation of δmin happens at dfmax = 0.8. Another important observation to
make is that at max(δ) two missed classifications are recorded and at max(δmin) how-
ever, the system achieves perfect classifications. This observation follows the saying: “the
chain is only as strong as its weakest link”, therefore, the optimal dfmax is where δmin is
maximised. This maximisation of δmin happens at dfmax = 0.8.
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Figure 7.3: Plot shows the effect of common data removal on the classifier’s discrimination
ability and the overall accuracy of the classifier.
The following digraphs are the top ten digraphs flagged as common using the stop list (in
descending order): Backspace Backspace, in, Backspace Space, Backspace
t, t Space, Tab Backspace, nt, Shift 9 (to produce ’(’), Shift [ (to produce
’{’) and Shift 5 (to produce ’%’) for dfmax ∈ [0.1, 0.9]. At dfmax = 1.0, no common data
is removed as there no terms that appear in all the documents. Furthermore, it is worth
noting that due to how the stop list works, the removed common terms are consistent for
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all dfmax ∈ [0.1, 0.9].
When observing the experimental results obtained using the OC-SVM based method
(in Chapter 5) and those presented here, it is clear that both sets of results are consis-
tent. Of importance is that using both methods the mean discrimination index peaked
at similar/close data removal rates, i.e. approximately 40% for the OC-SVM method and
37% for the stop list. These data removal rates are on par with each other as the differ-
ence between them is not substantial. Furthermore, both common data removal methods
removed data associated with more or less the same common digraphs. The digraphs
that appear in the top 10 commonly used digraphs for both algorithms are: Backspace
Backspace, in, nt and t Space.
Based on the discussions, it is clear that both data removal methods produced consistent
results (to a certain degree). However, it can be deduced that removal of common data
by means of a stop list is the better option compared to the OC-SVM based approach,
because:
 even though building the vocabulary is a time consuming task (due to the K-means
clustering), it only happens once. Therefore creating a stop list is less computation-
ally expensive and less time consuming compared to the OC-SVM based method
where multiple OC-SVM models that correspond with the various data removal
rates have to be created;
 the stop list method removes data with high accuracy and precision. The reason for
the good performance by the stop list method is that unlike the OC-SVM method
it does not used sampled data, rather, it computes the statistics of occurrence of
terms using all the available data.
The findings obtained from performing this experiment further display the benefit of
using text retrieval methods. The observations made here corroborate the findings made
in Chapter 5 and further prove that the removal of commonly occurring terms does indeed
improve the classifiers discrimination ability.
7.1.4 Query Length
The accuracy of a text retrieval system is, of course, related to the length of the query
which we denote by |q|, i.e. the number of terms in the query. In general, the longer
the query the better the chances of identifying documents that best match the user’s
information need, however, a text retrieval system should provide accurate results even
76
Chapter 7 Experiments
if the user query is not very long. Therefore, in this experiment, we investigate the effect
of query length on the system’s performance. Moreover, we aim to determine the least
number of terms (and subsequently the least number of keystrokes) required to accurately
authenticate a user. To achieve this, the length of a query is varied while dfmax is kept
constant at 0.8. The length was varied using a step size of 20 in the range [20, 100] and
a step size of 100 in the range (100, 1000].
7.1.4.1 Results
Looking at the results presented in Table 7.6, it can be deduced that the classifier’s
performance improves with an increase in the query length. When using short queries,
i.e. less than 100 terms, the classifier performs poorly. The reason for this is that when a
query has too few terms its vector representation it will contain a lot of zero terms thus
making it very sparse.
Table 7.6: The effect of query length on the classifier’s performance.















Acceptable classification accuracy is achieved using a query with 200/300 terms as only
one missed classification is recorded for both query lengths. This means that with as little
as 200 terms a user can be correctly classified 99% of the time. The actual number of
keystrokes required to create J terms is given by J + 1, therefore, when using query with
200 terms the user needs to provide 201 keystrokes. If one desires even better accuracy,
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then picking query lengths greater than 300 would be advisable. The effect of query
length on the classifier’s performance becomes invisible as the number of terms in the
query increases (query length greater than 300), this is observed by the saturation of the
classifier for query lengths greater than 300.
7.2 User Authentication
In this section, we perform experiments to understand the behaviour of the our approach
when given the task of authentication which is not as easy as the classification task. Here,
we perform experiments that test how well the system gives access to legitimate/legal
users and how robust it is against impostors. Therefore, we perform two tests, namely,
the legal connections and impostor attacks. For the legal connections test, a query known
to belong to user U , qU , is presented for authentication and the claimed identity is that
of U . Ideally, the system should grant access since it is a fact that qU belongs to U ,
however, if this is not the case a false alarm is recorded. The number of legal connections
that can be attempted is equal to n, the number of users in the system. Therefore the
number of legal connection we can attempt is 283 because as our system consists of 283
users. To quantify the performance of the system for the legal connections test we report
the FAR which is given by #false rejections/#legal connections.
To test the robustness of the system against impostors, a legal user U is attacked us-
ing typing samples from all other n − 1 users in the system. When a typing sample qX
(belonging to a known user UX) is used to attack U , UX ’s typing profile is temporarily
removed from the system so that UX is completely unknown to the system. This done
to so to mimic a real world impostor attack. Ideally, when U is being attacked by all the
n− 1 users the system should reject all the identity claims. In the case where the system
fails to reject an impostor, an impostor pass is recorded. This experiment is performed
for every legal user in the system, therefore, the total number of attempted impostor
attacks is 283× 282 = 79, 806. To quantify the algorithm’s robustness against impostors
we report the IPR which is given by #impostor passes/#attempted attacks.
For some of the experiments in this section, we use the knowledge learnt about the
algorithm in the classification-based experiments such as the optimal stop list size and
query length as (starting point) or (initial) values in the quest of determining the optimal




In Section 7.2, we presented a test that would be used to evaluate a user’s identity claim
during authentication. The test uses a threshold-based decision function to accept/reject
users. In this section, we perform an experiment to determine the value of the decision
threshold T by conducting the following experiment. A classification matrix similar to
Figure 7.1 is computed using dfmax = 0.8 and a query size of 1000 terms. Each similarity
score that lies on the main diagonal is then divided by the average of the similarity scores
in the respective column (the score on the main diagonal is excluded when computing
the average); we term this quotient the legal user quotient, LUQ for short. Thereafter,
the second best similarity score in the column is divided by the average of the similarity
scores (excluding the similarity score on the main diagonal and the second highest sim
score in the column) that remain in the column; we term this quotient potential impostor
quotient, PIQ for short.
The LUQ gives insight on how a user’s typing behaviour is distinctive compared to
other user’s in the system. If it is high, it means that the user has distinctive typing
traits and if it is low, it means that the user possess indistinct typing traits. Therefore,
a user with a low LUQ is prone to impostor attacks (due to them exhibiting indistinct
typing behaviour) compared to a user with a high LUQ. On the other hand, the PIQ
tell us the likeliness of a user being able to attack another user in the system due to the
similar typing traits exhibited by both users (the legal user and the potential impostor).
Therefore, if a user has distinctive typing behaviour (which results in a high similarity
score compared to all other (q, d) pairs), the LUQ will be higher than the PIQ of the
other user that is most similar.
The LUQ and PIQ values for all users are then presented using histograms as shown
in Figure 7.4. Ideally, the two histograms should not overlap, in this case the FAR and
IPR would both be zero. In reality, these two histograms are most likely to overlap as it
has already been established that some users exhibit similar typing behaviour. Referring
to Figure 7.4, it can be observed that the LUQ scores associated with users who have
distinctive typing features occur high up in the blue histogram where there is little or
not overlap with the possible impostors histogram. The opposite is true for LUQ scores
associated with users who do not possess distinctive typing traits as it can be seen that
there is overlap between the LUQ and PIQ histograms. This means that users within this
region of overlap are more prone to intrusion attacks. Therefore, in terms of the overall




Moving the T to the right increases the FAR and decreases the IPR and moving it
to the left does the opposite. Therefore, a T value that provides an acceptable trade-off
between the FAR and IPR should be established. To determine the optimal value of T ,
we vary the value of T in the range [1, 3] in increments of 0.2 and the T value that results
in the least FAR and IPR is chosen.















Distribution of LUQ and PIQ Scores
LUQ
PIQ
Figure 7.4: Histogram plot showing the distribution of LUQ and PIQ scores for all users
in the dataset.
7.2.1.1 Results
The experimental results are presented in Table 7.7 and illustrated in Figure 7.5. It can
be easily observed that for any T < 1.8 the best possible FAR is obtained as there no
legal users who are falsely rejected, however, for the same T values the IPRs are at their
worst. This observation shows that the T values in this range (T < 1.8), result in very
lenient decision functions which give easy access to both legal users and impostors. As T
increases more promising results are obtained and the optimal T value (where the trade-
off between variables FAR and IPR is reached) is obtained at the intersection of the two
plots which is approximately at T = 1.9 (the midpoint of values 1.8 and 2.0).
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Table 7.7: Experimental results for authentication accuracy for different thresholds.
T
Legal Connections Impostor Attacks
False Alarms FAR (%) Impostor Passes IPR (%)
1.0 0 0.00 39811 49.88
1.2 0 0.00 19292 24.17
1.4 0 0.00 6813 8.54
1.6 0 0.00 2020 2.53
1.8 1 0.35 651 0.82
2.0 6 2.12 263 0.33
2.2 34 12.01 122 0.15
2.4 112 39.58 57 0.07
2.6 156 55.12 27 0.03
2.8 198 69.96 15 0.02
3.0 226 78.95 8 0.01
In order to obtain the actual FAR and IPR that can be achieved at the optimal T value,
the experiment was performed for T = 1.9. From the experiment, it was discorvered that
at T = 1.9 a FAR of 1.41% was recored as a result of four users being falsely rejected
and the IPR was 0.57% due to 456 impostor passes. From the plot in Figure 7.5 it is
quite obvious that at the point of intersection the FAR increases from what it was at
T = 1.8 and on the other hand the IPR decreases even further. Even though T = 1.9
is the theoretical optimal point, we choose the optimal T value to be at T = 1.8 reason
being that the FAR achieved at T = 1.9 is greater than 1% and at T = 1.8 both the FAR
and IPR are less than 1%. When using the decision function associated with T = 1.8, a
legal user will be falsely rejected 7 times out of every 2,000 authentication attempts and
an impostor will be given access 41 times for every 4,500 attempted attacks. As T moves
more to the right (T > 1.8), the IPR improves while the FAR worsens.
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Authentication accuracy as a function of T
Figure 7.5: Plot shows the trade-off between the FAR and IPR as the decision threshold
is varied.
7.2.2 Removal of Common Data
In this experiment, we investigate the effect of the removal of common data on our
keystroke analysis algorithm when it is given an authentication task. This this experiment
is similar to the one presented in Section 7.1.3, with the difference being the type of task
given to the keystroke analysis algorithm.
7.2.2.1 Results
The outcomes of this experiment are presented in Table 7.8 and shown pictorially in
Figure 7.6. From the results, it can be observed that the removal of common typing data
favours the legal connections test, reason being that as less common data is removed the
FAR worsens. The best possible outcomes for this part of the experiment are achieved
when dfmax ∈ [0.2, 0.7] with a FAR of 0.00% being achieved. The worst FAR is recorded
at dfmax = 1.0 where no common data is removed
2. Unlike in the case of legal connections,




the results obtained for the impostor attacks part of the experiment suggest that non-
removal of common data has a positive effect on the algorithm’s ability to reject impostors.
From the plot, it can be seen that the IPR gets better as the amount of common data
removed gets less. At the same dfmax value where the worst FAR was recorded, the best
IPR is achieved.
Table 7.8: Experimental results for authentication accuracy at varying stop list sizes.
dfmax
Legal Connections Impostor Attacks
False Alarms FAR (%) Impostor Passes IPR (%)
0.1 3 1.06 14542 18.22
0.2 0 0.00 9077 11.37
0.3 0 0.00 6626 8.30
0.4 0 0.00 4883 6.12
0.5 0 0.00 3486 4.37
0.6 0 0.00 2214 2.77
0.7 0 0.00 1274 1.60
0.8 1 0.35 651 0.82
0.9 5 1.77 350 0.44
0.925 7 2.47 280 0.35
0.95 19 6.71 230 0.29
0.975 48 16.96 201 0.25
1.0 85 30.00 154 0.19
As it has been deduced that the removal of common data affects the legal connections
and the intrusion tests differently, it is necessary to determine a dfmax value where the
two metrics are at acceptable rates. The point of intersection of the FAR and IPR plots
shown in Figure 7.6 was estimated to be approximately at dfmax = 0.825. At this dfmax
value (which respresents the optimal dfmax), a FAR of 0.35% was achieved due to 1 false
rejection and the algorithm granted 571 impostor passes resulting in an IPR of 0.72%.
The aforementioned FAR and IPR were obtained by performing the experiment using
dfmax = 0.825. This dfmax value was accepted as the optimal dfmax setting.
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Authentication accuracy as a function of dfmax
Figure 7.6: Plot shows the trade-off between the FAR and IPR at varying dfmax.
7.2.3 Query Length
In the experiment detailed in Section 7.1.4, we investigated the effect of the query length
on the performance of our keystroke algorithm given a classification task. Therefore, we
determined the minimum number of terms (and consequently the number of keystrokes)
required to accurately classify a user. We perform a similar experiment here, however,
the algorithm is now evaluated on an authentication task with the aim to determine the
least number of keystrokes required to perform accurate user verification.
7.2.3.1 Results
Table 7.9 shows the outcomes of the authentication experiments when the query length is
varied. Moreover, the results are depicted in Figure 7.7. From the results, it can be eas-
ily observed that the algorithm’s performance improves with an increase in query length
as both the FAR and IPR decrease as |q| increases. The possible explanation for this
observation is that as the number of terms in q increases the number of zero components
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in ~V (q) reduces thereby improving the effectiveness with which the cosine similarity min-
imises θ (angle between ~V (q) and ~V (d)) in the case of legal connections and maximises
θ in the case of impostor attacks. Simply put, as |q| → L (L is number of terms in the
entire vocabulary); (L − |q|)/L → 0.0, therefore, FAR and IPR → 0.0%3. For example,
if |q| = 20 then ~V (q) will have 20 vector components with wti 6= 0 and the remaining
L− 20 components will have wti = 0. In case of our dataset, L = 13, 264. Therefore the
fraction of vector components with wti = 0 would be 0.99 (when using |q| = 20) which is
very substantial.
Regarding the legal connections, acceptable results (FAR < 1%) are obtained from
|q| ≥ 300 with the best possible FAR achieved at |q| = 400 and beyond. For query
lengths with 400 terms or more, the effect of increasing the number of terms is ineffec-
tive. This observation is implied by the saturation of the algorithm as the FAR remains
constant at 0.00%.
Table 7.9: Experimental results for authentication accuracy for different query lengths.
|q|
Legal Connections Impostor Attacks
False Alarms FAR (%) Impostor Passes IPR (%)
20 50 17.67 5189 6.50
40 30 10.60 2767 3.47
60 14 4.95 1887 2.36
80 11 3.89 1482 1.86
100 11 3.89 1348 1.69
200 3 1.06 911 1.14
300 1 0.35 770 0.96
400 0 0.00 716 0.90
500 0 0.00 646 0.81
600 0 0.00 616 0.77
700 0 0.00 600 0.75
800 0 0.00 578 0.72
900 0 0.00 575 0.72
1000 0 0.00 571 0.72
When looking at the impostor attacks test results, it can be seen that the global minimum
3The assumption made when making these approximations is that q is made up of unique terms only–
each term appears once and there are no repeating terms. In reality, this is very unlikely, however this
assumption makes the discussion presented here less complex.
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of the IPR is at approximately |q| = 1000. This implies that |q| = 1000 is optimal as
it reults in the lowest number of impostor passes. However, it is worth noting that
the effect of |q| of on impostor passes diminishes as |q| → 1000; this is shown by the
algorithm’s performance beginning to saturate for approximately |q| ≥ 700. Therefore,
using |q| ∈ [700, 1000] would result in approximately the same authentication performance
as the difference in IPR is not substantial in this range. Prior studies [54, 72] suggest
that a typing sample of at least 1000 keystrokes is required in order to achieve adequate
authentication performance. However, it can be deduced that acceptable performance
(where both the FAR and IPR are less than 1%) is achieved from approximately |q| ≥ 300.
This implies that decent user authentication can be achieved when using a query with
as little as 301 keystrokes and if one requires even better performance they can simply
increase |q| and consequently the number of required keystrokes.










































Authentication accuracy as a function of |q|
Figure 7.7: Plot shows the trade-off between the FAR and IPR at varying query lengths.
7.2.4 Benchmarking against the State-of-the-art
In this experiment, we benchmark our keystroke dynamics algorithm against one of the
state-of-the-art KSD authentication algorithms found in literature. To perform the bench-
mark, we replicate the free-text based authentication algorithm suggested by Gunetti
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and Picardi’s [33]. This is achieved by re-implementing their authentication algorithm
(in Python) based on the descriptions provided in the paper. Furthermore, the authors
were emailed to clarify some details regarding the operation of their algorithm and to
obtain original dataset4 from the published study as it is available upon request.
7.2.4.1 Algorithm
GP’s algorithm uses two measures when determining the distance between two typing
samples, namely, the “R-Measure” (R stands for “Relative”) which was introduced by
Bergadano et al. [64] and the “A-Measure” (A stands for “Absolute”) which was devised
by the authors of [33]. The R-Measure is based on the relative duration of n-graphs,
i.e., the time between the first and last of n subsequent key-presses. The idea behind
the R-Measure is that if the user’s typing behaviour is affected by factors such as stress,
fatigue or external environmental factors their typing speeds will change uniformly for
the typed n-graphs, thereby leaving the relative ordering of the times unchanged. First,
the n-graphs are extracted from each typing sample. Thereafter, common n-graphs be-
tween the two samples are determined and stored in lists (one for each sample) with the
n-graphs sorted by their average duration. In the case where the average digraph are
identical, alphabetical order is used as a tie-breaker. The degree of disorder of each list
is the ten calculated by taking the sum of the distances between the position of each
n-graph in sample 1 and its position in sample 2.
We denote the degree of disorder between two typing samples, S1 and S2 as R2(S1, S2)
with n = 2. R-Measures of different n-graphs can be combined to create a composite. For
example, R2,3(S1, S2) is defined as the sum of R2(S1, S2) and R3(S1, S2). More formally,
R-Measures can be combine as follows5:
Rn,m(S1, S2) = Rn(S1, S2) +Rm(S1, S2) (7.1)
The R-Measure suffers from one main limitation: in the case where the two users have
the same relative timings but different absolute timings the R-Measure fails as the system
may be convinced that the samples come from the same user. To address this limitation,
the A-Measure was devised. This measure focuses on the absolute timings of the n-graphs
4The dataset used in GP’s published study contained typing data from 40 legal users and 165 impostors
, the dataset we obtained from GP contained typing samples from 31 legal users and the same number
of impostors. The reason for this is that not all the participants consented for their data to be shared
with third parties.
5The version of (7.1) in the original study is scaled by N and M which are the number of n-graphs
and m-graphs shared by samples. However, based on e-mail communication with the study authors, we
learnt that the scaling is not necessary. Therefore, we use the non-scaled version of the equation.
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to ensure that the typing speeds between two sample under comparison are similar enough
to have come from the same user. Two n-graph durations y and z are said to be similar
if 1 < max(y, z)/min(y, z) ≤ t; for t > 1. We use t = 1.05 as this value was found to be
optimal in [33]6. The A-Measure is formally defined as:
Atn(S1, S2) = 1− (τ/φ) (7.2)
where τ is the number of similar n-graphs between the S1 and S2, and φ is the total
number of n-graphs shared between S1 and S2. Similarly, A-Measures can be combined
in the same way as R-Measures and the two measures can be summed.
To authenticate a user given an unknown sample X claimed to belong to a known user
A, we first decide on the distance measure, that is, the R-Measure, A-Measure or a com-
bination of the two. The intra-mean distance, m(A), which is the distance between A’s
reference samples is determined. Thereafter, we compute the inter-mean, md(B,X), dis-
tance between X and all other users in the system, B. The unknown sample X is deemed
to belong to user A if the following conditions hold [33]:
1. md(A,X) < md(B,X) for all known users in the system other than A;
2. md(A,X) is smaller than m(A) and closer to m(A) than it is to any other md(B,X)
value. That is, the following conditions apply:
(a) md(A,X) < m(A)
(b) md(A,X) < 0.5[md(B,X) +m(A)]
7.2.4.2 Experiment
In order to compare of the two methods (ours and GP’s), we test our method on GP’s
dataset and GP’s algorithm on one of our datasets, i.e. the dataset collected on the prac-
tice site. To apply our algorithm on GP’s dataset, we combine all the 15 typing samples
provided by each legal user into one large sample. We then perform legal connections and
intrusion tests as described in the preceding sections. For the intrusion test, an additional
165 samples (which are impostor samples in GP’s dataset) are used to attack the legals
users which results in 31 × (30 + 165) = 6, 045 attempted attacks. In order to evaluate
GP’s algorithm on our dataset, we split each user’s typing profile into 15 samples of 800
keystrokes each7. The legal connections and intrusion tests are performed as described in
6Based on e-mail communication with the study authors, we learnt that the best t value (for the
A-Measure) is 1.05 and not 1.25 as reported in the published study.
7In GP’s dataset each typing sample consists about 700 to 900 keystrokes, therefore, we create the
samples with 800 keystrokes which is the average.
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[33]. Furthermore, as an attempt to make the comparison fair, we only use typing data
from the top 31 participants (in our dataset) as the dataset received from GP has typing
data from 31 legal users.
To tune our algorithm, we use the knowledge learnt about the behaviour of the algorithm
from the experiments presented in the preceding sections. Therefore, in this experiment,
we use T = 1.8, |q| = 1000 and dfmax = 0.825 for our algorithm when tested on our
dataset. Since the dataset from GP is not the same as the one used in the published
study, we perform experiments to determine the optimal distance measure to tune GP’s
algorithm for their dataset. Moreover, we perform experiments to find the optimal dis-
tance measure for our dataset when applying their algorithm to it. Similarly, we conduct
an experiment to determine T and dfmax for when evaluating our algorithm on GP’s
dataset; we do not perform an experiment to determine |q| instead we use |q| = 1000.
7.2.4.3 Results
The experiments described in [33] were replicated, however, the results achieved when
applying our re-implementation on their dataset were in some cases far from the results
reported in their paper. With our re-implementation, the best results achieved were a
FAR of 19.78% and an IPR of 0.2%. These results were achieved using distance measure
R2,3 + A2,4. The IPR achieved was comparable to the one reported in [33], however, the
FAR was very far from the FAR reported in the original study. Even after consulting
with the study authors and other parties that replicated the algorithm, the FAR did not
improve much. Nonetheless, we apply our algorithm on GP’s dataset and compare the
results with the those reported in [33].
Through experimentation, the optimal parameters when applying our algorithm on GP’s
dataset were found to be: dfmax = 0.4 and T = 3.1. The LUQ and PIQ distributions of
GP’s dataset obtained using the aforementioned parameters are shown in Figure 7.8. The
least overlap (of 18 users) between the two histograms was found to be at dfmax = 0.4.
It can be easily noted that the dfmax optimal for GP’s datasets is lesser than that of our
dataset. This implies that more stop words are removed from GP’s datasets compared
to our dataset.
The best results obtained in [33] together with the results achieved by applying our algo-
rithm on GP’s dataset are shown Table 7.10. Due to the difference in operation between
GP’s algorithm and ours, and the dataset size received from GP; the total number of legal
connections and attempted intrusions are not the same. In [33], a total of 40× 15 = 600
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legal connections and 600× 39× 15 + 165× 40× 15 = 450, 000 attacks were attempted.
When using our algorithm, a total of 31 legal connections and 31 × (30 + 165) = 6, 045
intrusions were attempted. Due to these differences we only report the percentages in
Table 7.10.


















Distribution of LUQ and PIQ Scores: Gunetti and Picardi’s Dataset
LUQ
PIQ
Figure 7.8: Histogram plot showing the distribution of LUQ and PIQ scores for all users
in GP’s dataset.
From the results presented in Table 7.10, it can be seen that difference between the FARs
achieved by both algorithms is not substantial. On the contrary, the IPR achieved with
our algorithm is the worst compared to the one in GP’s study. The possible explanation
for this observation may be overlap of 18 users between the LUQ and PIQ histograms.
The overlap is quite high considering that the dataset only consists of 31 users thus re-
sulting in an overlap of 18/31 = 58%. Attempts of reducing the IPR by moving the
threshold T resulted in increased false rejections thereby increasing the FAR. Therefore,
the results shown here are the best possible results achievable when applying our authen-
tication algorithm on GP’s dataset.
In terms of the time taken to authenticate a single user, our algorithm out-performed
GP’s algorithm as the average time taken to authenticate a single user in this experiment
was approximately 1.00 second on an Intel Core i7 at 3.0 GHz. Even though the dataset
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here was smaller compared to that used in [33] and we had a more faster CPU, we reckon
that our algorithm would still be faster even if the experimental environment was exactly
as in [33]. We did not have access to a Pentium IV at 2.5 GHz machine (CPU used in
[33]) to test our algorithm and see how it would compare.
Table 7.10: Experimental results for authentication accuracy on achieved GP’s dataset
when apply their algorithm and our text-retrieval based algorithm.
Algorithm FAR (%) IPR (%)
Gunetti & Picardi 3.17 0.03
Ours 3.23 2.22
7.3 Remarks
While the algorithm is clearly capable of authenticating users, and does so reasonably
well, it is not without its downfalls.
1. Ideally, a user verification system should only require and use data from the user
undergoing verification. Therefore, negative data (data from potential impostors)
should be unnecessary as there should be no need to compare to other people in or-
der to verify a user’s identity. A serious drawback with the proposed authentication
algorithm is that it requires negative data as it compares users when performing
authentication. Even though this may work for the number of users we have in the
datasets we use, it may not scale well for systems with millions/billions of users as
the comparison of typing samples would be time consuming and computationally
expensive. Moreover, in such systems (where there is a very high number of users)
it is highly likely that the number of users with similar typing traits will increase;
therefore using the current authentication rule would most likely increase both the
FAR and IPR to a point where the authentication algorithm may become useless.
2. The time needed to build a vocabulary of terms is proportional to the number of
keystrokes in a datasets, therefore making the process time consuming for typist
datasets of substantial size.
3. Computing the match between two typing samples (using the cosine similarity) is
done almost immediately since matches are pre-computed (during the quantisation)
when building the vocabulary of terms. Therefore, it is not much of a challenge
that a substantial amount of time is spent building a vocabulary as the benefit is
that document comparisons can be computed very quickly.
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4. Creating a stop list is less computationally expensive compared to the OC-SVM
based common data removal method. The reason for this is that a vocabulary is
built once, however, with the OC-SVM a new model has to be built every time
when the value of ν is changed. Moreover, data removal by means of a stop list
is more efficient and provides better accuracy compared to the method suggested
in Chapter 5. Therefore, this method address all the limitations of the OC-SVM
based method which are discussed in Section 5.5.
7.4 Conclusion
This chapter presented the experiments conducted to evaluate the free-text keystroke
dynamics authentication proposed in Chapter 6. The performed experiments tested the
proposed algorithm using classification and authentication-based tasks. Furthermore, the
suggested authentication algorithm was compared with the state-of-the-art in free-text
keystroke analysis. The chapter then concluded with a discussion of the strengths and




This dissertation investigates the use of keystroke dynamics as a means of authentication
for online persons. As a result, two algorithms were presented, the first one being the
data pre-processing algorithm for detecting and removing common behavioural data for
typing behaviour exhibited by most users. The second algorithm was a keystroke dynam-
ics authentication algorithm for free-text input.
The first algorithm (presented in Chapter 5) exploited a novelty detection algorithm–
the OC-SVM to identify data points that are common amongst users in a typists dataset.
This removal of common data points was performed with the aim of improving the classi-
fiers discrimination ability. The algorithm was then applied to the data to create smaller
datasets that contained less common data. Through experimentation, it was shown that
classifiers discrimination ability improved as a result of the removal of common data.
Even though the common data removal algorithm demonstrated effectiveness, it was not
without shortcomings, which include:
1. Fitting the models for varying values of ν, i.e. ν ∈ [0.2, 0.8] is a memory intensive
task that gets worse as the value of ν increases.
2. The accuracy of the algorithm is very dependant on the sample used to create the
super user’s typing profile. Therefore, the representativeness of the sample relative
to the entire dataset has a significant effect on the performance of the algorithm.
The authentication algorithm borrowed concepts from the field of text retrieval. Here,
identity verification by keystroke dynamics was redefined as a text retrieval problem by
creating the notion of words/terms built from KSD features. By so doing, we redefined
authentication by keystrokes as a text retrieval problem where a user is equivalent to a
document and a typing sample provided during authentication is equivalent to a query.
The algorithm was evaluated on classification-based tasks and it achieved acceptable
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results on both our datasets and three additional (third party) datasets with the best
percentage of error being 0.00% and the worst being 13.95%. A further investigation was
performed to understand the possible reasons that led to the worst classification perfor-
mance of our algorithm on one of the third party datasets (Stewart’s), these reasons are
presented in Section 7.1.2.
One of the key findings made from the classification-based experiments (presented in
Section 7.1.2) is that the environmental factors have an effect on how one types (espe-
cially if they are novice typists like in the case of the majority of the participants in our
study). Some of these environmental factors include: the type of environment (whether it
is open or closed), the users stress when sitting for assessments and the type of keyboard
used. Notwithstanding the aforementioned observations regarding the effect of changing
environmental factors a a user’s typing signature, we are of the opinion that changing
environmental factors may have minimal effects on skilled typists as they a more de-
fined signature which they have mastered over time. Therefore, we conclude that typing
behaviour is just like any other human behaviour which is most likely to change given
varying circumstances.
Furthermore, the algorithm was also evaluated on authentication-based tasks where it
was also compared against the state-of-the-art algorithm found in KSD literature. One
of observations to note made from the authentication-based experiments, particularly the
experiment presented in Section 7.2.3, is that using our algorithm, adequate authenti-
cation performance (FAR and IPR less than 1%) can be achieved using as little as 301
keystrokes. When tuned using the optimal parameter settings i.e. T = 1.8, |q| = 1000
and dfmax = 0.825, our method achieved a FAR of 0.00% and an IPR of 0.72%.
When comparing our method to the state-of-the-art, it was learnt that our algorithm
does not match the state-of-the-art, especially regarding the IPR– the state-of-the-art
achieved an IPR of 0.03% and our algorithm came in at 2.22%. The difference between
the FAR achieved by the state-of-the-art algorithm and our algorithm was not signifi-
cant, i.e. 3.23%− 3.17% = 0.06%. The only part where our algorithm out-performed the
state-of-the-art is regarding the time taken to authenticate a user. It is worth noting that
even though the algorithm performed below par when compared to the state-of-the-art,
the results achieved are acceptable.
In Chapter 5, we presented a OC-SVM based method for detecting and removing common
typing patterns which can be applied to the data at the data pre-processing step. The
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application of text retrieval methods in the authentication algorithm provided a more
efficient way of removing common data through the concept of a stop list. Common
data removal by means of a stop list addressed the issues presented by the OC-SVM.
Furthermore, it was shown that both common data removal methods provided more or
less the same effect in terms of the amount of data removed and the improvement of the
classifiers discrimination ability, however, the stop list proved to be the superior option
for the task. One of the benefits of the application of text retrieval methods in KSD
is that we were able to build an identity verification system that provides us with an
additional ability of easily removing commonly used features.
8.1 Summary of Contributions
The contributions made by this dissertation are summarised below.
1. Two typist datasets of anonymous users collected in real-world situations in two
different environments– closed and open-setting environments, i.e. the assessment
site and practice site, respectively. Moreover, the collected datasets allow for thor-
ough evaluation of free-text keystroke analysis algorithms as they are sufficiently
large.
2. Two methods of detecting and removing common keystroke behaviour which proved
to be effective in improving the discrimination of a keystroke analysis classifier.
Additionally, the removal of less informative typing data provided side benefits
such as reduced model training times and smaller datasets (and smaller index files
in the case of the text retrieval based method) that occupy less disk space thereby
using less computing resources.
3. A novel free-text keystroke analysis authentication algorithm that borrows concepts
and methods from the field of text retrieval. The algorithm’s performance is on par
with the state-of-the-art authentication algorithms in KSD literature. Our algo-
rithm’s performance is on par with the state-of-the-art authentication algorithms
achieving similar FAR scores, slightly higher IPR scores but faster execution times.
8.2 Future Work
This section highlights some of the promising avenues of future work that were identified
during the course of this study.
With regard to the OC-SVM common data removal method (presented in Chapter 5),
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the future may include an investigation into how typing patterns would compare if par-
ticipants are given a mix of essay and programming typing tasks. Additionally, an inves-
tigation into the optimal data removal rate for this dataset of 40% is warranted to see
how it may change if:
 different dataset is used;
 the typing tasks are performed by non-skilled vs. skilled typists, or,
 the keystrokes are collected on coding vs. essay-type typing tasks.
Lastly, considering that this algorithm performance relies heavily on how well the data
used to create the super user is sampled. It may worthwhile to investigate sampling tech-
niques that would allow for the sampled data to be representative of the whole dataset
in order to improve the performance of the the algorithm.
Regarding the proposed text retrieval-based authentication algorithm, it may be inter-
esting to evaluate this method on the task of user identification. The number of clusters
(k) for the K-means clustering was chosen empirically. Therefore, it may be beneficial to
investigate the optimal k that provides the best quantisation and consequently improve
the quality of retrieval. Furthermore, the vocabulary can also be expanded by including
larger n-graphs such as trigraphs and four-graphs to create more a complex vocabulary
that consist of a mix terms of variable lengths. The effects of environmental conditions
on a users typing may be further investigated by performing well designed experiments
where variables are controlled and monitored accordingly so that the experiments are
more deterministic and more reliable.
The suggested authentication rule suffers from one main drawback (which has been ex-
tensively discussed in Section 7.3), i.e. the authentication rule used negative data when
authenticating a user. To address this limitation a verification system that does not
require negative data can be devised with the aid of one-class classifiers. When using
the OCC approach, the authentication decision depends on the data from a single user–
the user who is being authenticated. The authors of [81] propose a variation of the OC-
SVM that works with textual features. Therefore, it may be advantageous to employing
one-class classifier such as the one by [81] instead of using the current authentication rule.
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[58] K. Revett, S. T. De Magalhães, and H. M. Santos, “Enhancing login security through
the use of keystroke input dynamics,” in International Conference on Biometrics.
Springer, 2006, pp. 661–667.
[59] E. Yu and S. Cho, “Novelty detection approach for keystroke dynamics identity ver-
ification,” in International conference on intelligent data engineering and automated
learning. Springer, 2003, pp. 1016–1023.
[60] R. N. Rodrigues, G. F. Yared, C. R. d. N. Costa, J. B. Yabu-Uti, F. Violaro, and L. L.
Ling, “Biometric access control through numerical keyboards based on keystroke
dynamics,” in International Conference on Biometrics. Springer, 2006, pp. 640–
646.
[61] M. Brown and S. J. Rogers, “User identification via keystroke characteristics of
typed names using neural networks,” International Journal of Man-Machine Studies,
vol. 39, no. 6, pp. 999–1014, 1993.
101
Chapter 8 References
[62] L. K. Maisuria, C. S. Ong, and W. K. Lai, “A comparison of artificial neural networks
and cluster analysis for typing biometrics authentication,” in IJCNN’99. Interna-
tional Joint Conference on Neural Networks. Proceedings (Cat. No. 99CH36339),
vol. 5. IEEE, 1999, pp. 3295–3299.
[63] D. Umphress and G. Williams, “Identity verification through keyboard character-
istics,” International journal of man-machine studies, vol. 23, no. 3, pp. 263–273,
1985.
[64] F. Bergadano, D. Gunetti, and C. Picardi, “User authentication through keystroke
dynamics,” ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC),
vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 367–397, 2002.
[65] D. Gunetti, C. Picardi, and G. Ruffo, “Dealing with different languages and old
profiles in keystroke analysis of free text,” in Congress of the Italian Association for
Artificial Intelligence. Springer, 2005, pp. 347–358.
[66] P. Dowland, S. Furnell, and M. Papadaki, “Keystroke analysis as a method of ad-
vanced user authentication and response,” in Security in the Information Society.
Springer, 2002, pp. 215–226.
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A Data Collection Schedule
Below is the schedule that was followed during the data collection phase. The assessments
were usually conducted on Thursdays afternoon, with an exception on the 24th and 29th
of May. An assessment session being an hour long. Each student was only entitled to no
more than a single session per assessment day.
Table A1: Data collection schedule.
Event Date
Publishing of the informed consent form 11 February 2019
Data collection started on practise site 20 February 2019
Assessment 1 14 March 2019
Public holiday (No Assessment) 21 March 2019
Assessment 2 04 April 2019
Assessment 3 11 April 2019
Assessment 4 18 April 2019
Assessment 5 25 April 2019
Assessment 6 02 May 2019
Assessment 7 09 May 2019
Assessment 8 16 May 2019
Assessment 9 24 May 2019
Assessment 10 29 May 2019
Assessment 11 30 May 2019
Assessment 12 6 June 2019
Practice site was taken down 7 June 2019
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B Participant Keystroke Contribution
Below is a table of the keystroke contributions made by the 283 participants who con-
sented for their to be recorded and for experimentation for the purpose of this dissertation.
The table shows the number of keystrokes recorded from each participant on both the
practice and assessment site.
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Table B1: Keystroke contributions (on the practice and assessment sites) of the partici-
pants that consented.
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C Common Digraphs Removed by the OC-SVM
Table C1: The top 10 digraphs (ordered in descending order) removed by the One-Class
Support Vector Machines (OC-SVM) based common data removal algorithm at varying
data removal rates.
% of Data Removed Top 10 Removed Digraphs
20
Backspace Backspace
Right-Arrow Right-Arrow
in
nt
Left-Arrow Left-Arrow
Right-Arrow Backspace
Down-Arrow Down-Arrow
; Enter
su
t Space
30
Backspace Backspace
Right-Arrow Right-Arrow
in
Left-Arrow Left-Arrow
nt
Down-Arrow Down-Arrow
; Enter
Right-Arrow Backspace
um
su
40
Backspace Backspace
Right-Arrow Right-Arrow
in
Left-Arrow Left-Arrow
nt
Down-Arrow Down-Arrow
; Enter
Up-Arrow Up-Arrow
um
Right-Arrow Backspace
XII
Chapter Appendices
50
Backspace Backspace
Right-Arrow Right-Arrow
in
Left-Arrow Left-Arrow
Down-Arrow Down-Arrow
nt
Up-Arrow Up-Arrow
; Enter
um
t Space
60
Backspace Backspace
Right-Arrow Right-Arrow
Left-Arrow Left-Arrow
in
Down-Arrow Down-Arrow
nt
Up-Arrow Up-Arrow
; Enter
t Space
um
70
Backspace Backspace
Right-Arrow Right-Arrow
Left-Arrow Left-Arrow
in
Down-Arrow Down-Arrow
nt
Up-Arrow Up-Arrow
; Enter
t Space
Enter Enter
XIII
Chapter Appendices
80
Backspace Backspace
Right-Arrow Right-Arrow
Left-Arrow Left-Arrow
in
Down-Arrow Down-Arrow
nt
Up-Arrow Up-Arrow
; Enter
t Space
Enter Enter
XIV
